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CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE
PETER P. FENTON*

INTRODUCTION

This Article consists of a case study illustrating how an eminent
domain taking of real estate came undone. This issue arose in the
context of an attempt by a municipal administration to erect a new
civic stadium with private financing in the city of Springfield, Mas
sachusetts. To appreciate the intricacies of the case, this Introduc
tion provides the factual and legal background which gave rise to
the controversy.
Based upon his belief that downtown revitalization would im
prove the overall quality of life for Springfield residents, Michael J.
Albano, Mayor of Springfield, made downtown revitalization a key
goal of his administration. An important part of his revitalization
plan involved bringing professional minor league basebalP back to

* City Solicitor, City of Springfield Law Department. Western New England
College School of Law (J.D. 1980). Although this case study was prepared under the
direction and supervision of the City Solicitor, the final work product reflects a joint
effort by the Law Department lawyers who worked on the case, including: Harry P.
Carroll, Deputy City Solicitor; Patricia T. Martinelli, Chief of Litigation; Kathleen T.
Breck, Associate City Solicitor; and Edward M. Pikula, Assistant City Solicitor. Each
attorney contributed materials to the various areas according to their individual in
volvement and efforts during the course of the litigation.
1. Sports and recreation have a unique significance for Springfield, which is the
birthplace of basketball. Mayor Albano believes that a new civic stadium in Springfield
would promote the city's general welfare by improving the quality of life for city re
sidents and bolstering the city's image as an entertainment and tourist center. Minor
league baseball is a form of affordable entertainment. Families can attend games for
less than the cost of going to the movies. Adding baseball to Springfield's mix of attrac
tions would improve the quality of life in the city by bringing the community together
through a common interest in rooting for the home team. Minor league baseball is an
activity that is popular among people of all ages and socioeconomic groups. Diverse
fans would enhance the image of downtown Springfield, strengthen the community, and
help promote the city's livability. The new stadium would not be used exclusively for a
professional baseball team. Besides only playing a limited number of games a year, the
team would have many out of town games when the stadium could be used for other
public purposes. A civic stadium could be used by young athletes attending Springfield
public schools to hold important baseball or softball games. Such a stadium could also
be used to host state semi-finals and final championship games. It would also be availa
ble to area schools, colleges and universities so they could make use of a new state-of
the-art sports facility for sporting and civic events. Besides baseball, other family-ori
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Springfield. 2 To accomplish that objective, it was necessary to erect
a civic stadium. This could only be achieved through the coopera
tive efforts of the public and private sectors. The Mayor's plan
called for the city to acquire an appropriate site for the stadium,
and for the private sector-operating through a not-for-profit cor
poration-to acquire a baseball team and finance the construction
of the new civic stadium. Once constructed and paid for, the new
civic stadium was to be owned by the city. Prior to that time, a
ground lease between the city and the not-for-profit corporation
would permit the city to use the new stadium, without rent, for civic
and public events. A site for the new civic stadium was carefully
selected to increase social and economic activity in the downtown
area, particularly during the crucial evening and weekend hours. 3
On September 22, 1999, the City Council voted for orders of
taking ("Taking Orders") relative to the site for a new civic stadium
("Site").4 These Taking Orders were then approved by the mayor.
They were recorded in the Hampden County Registry of Deeds and
the Hampden Registry District of the Land Court on September 23,
1999. On September 29, 1999, Deputy City Solicitor Harry P. Car
roll was asked at a city council subcommittee meeting about the
legal ramifications of a vote by citizens to overturn the Taking Orented programs, social and civic events could be held in the new civic stadium. A sta
dium would bring intangible benefits to the city as well. It would make people
optimistic about the downtown's future. It would provide activities for the entertain
ment, enjoyment, and pleasure of the citizens. It would be an additional place for pub
lic gatherings. Having minor league baseball in the city would cause Springfield's name
to be repeated throughout the Northeast in the sports pages and electronic media, en
hancing the city's image. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
2. It was determined that the best place for a new civic stadium would be in
downtown Springfield, where it would complement other projects such as the new Bas
ketball Hall of Fame and the Convention Center, and further Springfield's joint publicI
private goal of improving its downtown as a sports and entertainment destination.
3. Mayor Albano believes that a new civic stadium would bring more people
downtown. It would provide a needeci opportunity for an affordable family outing,
generate civic pride, cause greater utilization of the city's existing business base, and
further the city's efforts to become a major attraction for visitors and businesses.
Sports, entertainment, and special events have an economic spin-off effect that would
strengthen city businesses, particularly those located in the downtown area. The base
ball team was expected to have an operating budget of more than two million dollars,
much of which would be spent locally. During the baseball season, visiting teams would
travel to Springfield and remain here for two to four days at a time, and fans attending
the games would engage in spending. The construction of a new civic stadium was
expected to create scores of construction jobs over an eighteen-month time frame, in
addition to fifteen full-time jobs and perhaps as many as one hundred part-time jobs
during the baseball season.
4. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (1998) (requiring a city council to make an
appropriation by a two-thirds vote).
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ders. Carroll responded that "[c]hallenging an eminent domain
proceeding by referendum might be unconstitutional."5 In view of
the significance of this complex legal question and the concerns it
generated from all levels of city government, Springfield City Solici
tor Peter P. Fenton directed the city's legal review board to imme
diately research the relevant law and draft a report.
On October 8, 1999, Attorney Frank P. Fitzgerald wrote to
Mayor Albano demanding payment on behalf of his client, Dreison
Investments, Inc., one of the landowners whose property had been
taken for a portion of the civic stadium. Late in the afternoon of
October 12, 1999,454 binding referendum petitions ("Referendum
Petitions") to the City Council were filed with the City Clerk's of
fice protesting against the Taking Orders. The Referendum Peti
tions were transmitted to the election office by the City Clerk for
certification of signatures on October 13, 1999.
On October 14, 1999, the city's legal review board completed
its work. City Solicitor Fenton publicly issued a report to resolve
the legal question of whether an eminent domain taking by the city
was subject to a local referendum petition. The report concluded
that a referendum, if applied to the city's eminent domain taking of
the Site, would violate the United States Constitution as well as the
Massachusetts Constitution. 6
The Springfield Board of Election Commissioners' staff re
viewed the Referendum Petitions. After five days of examination,
it was determined that 11,020 registered city voters had signed the
Referendum Petitions. In accordance with state law, the election
commission certified to the City Clerk, William Metzger, that the
Referendum Petitions had 11,020 valid signatures.?
On October 22, 1999, Solicitor Fenton received a copy of a let
ter from Attorney John S. Leonard on behalf of his client, North
gate Center LLC, another of the landowners whose property had
been taken for a portion of the Site. Attorney Leonard's letter al
leged that his "clients' constitutional rights were violated by the
city's purported taking of the Northgate Plaza."8 Citing the local
5. City of Springfield Law Department, Report of the City Solicitor: Eminent
Domain Referendum 2 (Oct. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Eminent Domain Referendum] (on
file with the author).
6. See id. at 58; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (1998).
7. Thus, the statutory threshold of 12% of registered voters was met. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 37 (1998) (requiring 12% of registered voters for a Referendum
Petition).
8. Letter from John S. Leonard, attorney for Northgate Center LLC, to Peter P.
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referendum law, Attorney Leonard contended that the Taking Or
ders had "been suspended from taking effect" and demanded that
the city "forthwith cease and desist from taking any action whatso-.
ever in furtherance of" the Taking Orders. 9
The Taking Orders awarded a total $3,925,500.00 for that tak
ing. The notices of taking to the former owners of the property
informed them that they could pick up their checks for payment at
the city treasurer's office "on or after November 1, 1999."10 City
Solicitor Fenton informed Matthew E. Donnellan, the Collector/
Treasurer of Springfield, of Attorney Fitzgerald's demand for pay
ment on behalf of his client. l l State law obligated the city treasurer
"within fifteen days after demand" to immediately make proper
payment available to the persons entitled thereto.1 2 This amounted
to a payment of $1,637,500.00, which was due October 25, 1999.
City Treasurer Donnellan was also notified that a Referendum Peti
tion had been filed protesting the City Council's vote and the city's
eminent domain taking of the property. These circumstances left
Donnellan in a quandary. He wanted to fulfill his legal obligation
to make payment for the property taken by the city, but he did not
want to jeopardize the public interest by paying $1,637,500.00 for
property subject to a political process (i.e., a local referendum seek
ing to void the land taking for which payment was due). City Solici
tor Fenton directed the Springfield Law Department to take
immediate action to settle the legal issues and terminate the uncer
tainty and controversy.
On October 25, 1999, the city of Springfield, its mayor, and
treasurer (collectively called "City") petitioned a single Justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") for a declara
tion of their rights with respect to a taking of private property by
eminent domain for a new municipal stadium ("Petition"). The Pe
tition also sought temporary equitable relief to preserve the City's
financial and legal interests until such time as the case was decided.
The Petition asked the court to resolve a conflict between the local
referendum and eminent domain laws-a conflict with constitu
tional significance that goes to the root of the government's power
Fenton, City Solicitor, City of Springfield Law Department (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with
author).
9. Id.
10. Notice of Taking (Sept. 22, 1999) (on file with author).
11. The Collectorrrreasurer of Springfield is required to issue all checks payable
by the City.
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 7B (1998).
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of eminent domain and the individual's right to private property. A
hearing in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was sched
uled. The parties, however, would not agree to the facts underlying
the Petition and the Justice transferred the Petition to the
Hampden County Superior Court for disposition.
Associate Superior Court Justice, Constance M. Sweeney con
solidated the Petition with several other cases.13 Judge Sweeney
recognized that a decisive issue had been raised in one of the newly
consolidated actions-whether there was a "valid purpose" for the
eminent domain takings. Judge Sweeney ruled that a trial would be
held on this issue before dealing with the constitutional issues. Fol
lowing the trial, Judge Sweeney ruled that there was not a legiti
mate public purpose for the eminent domain takings and held them
invalid. 14 Consequently, the statutory and constitutional issues
originally raised by the City in its Petition remain undecided.
Part I of this Article discusses the unresolved statutory issues
arising from an attempt to overturn an eminent domain taking by
means of a referendum petition. The unresolved state constitu
tional issues are discussed in Part II, while Part III outlines the fed
eral constitutional issues involved. Part IV of this Article discusses
the municipality's position concerning the decisive public purpose
issue and the court's resolution of this dispute. This Article outlines
the relevant law regarding these unresolved issues and concludes
that an eminent domain taking is not subject to the referendum
process.
I.

LOCAL REFERENDUM LAW AS ApPLIED TO EMINENT
DOMAIN TAKING

State statutes make it unlikely that a referendum designed to
overturn a taking by eminent domain would be legally valid. The
primary reason is that an order taking property by eminent domain
is not a "measure" within the meaning of that statutory term. Pur
suant to Massachusetts State Law 15 and the charter of the city of
Springfield ("Charter"), the city council, at the request of any de
partment, and with the approval of the mayor, may take property
by eminent domain. On the evening of September 22, 1999, the
City Council voted to approve four separate orders. The first order
13. See City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014,
2000 WL 782971 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000).
14. See id. at *1; see also infra Part IV.B.
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, ch. 43 § 30.
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accepted two grants associated with a baseball stadium in Spring
field. One of the grants accepted was a Community Development
Action Grant ("CDAG II"). That order stated that the "City Coun
cil of the City of Springfield, with the approval of the mayor, hereby
accepts the CDAG II grant and authorizes the grant funds to be
expended for the purposes outlined in the grant, including site ac
quisition .... "16 Three other votes taken that evening ordered that
the City take certain parcels of land by eminent domain. The
mayor approved each order on September 22, 1999. Orders taking
the parcels were recorded in the Hampden County Registry of
Deeds on September 23, 1999.
Section 42 of the City Charter, which parallels section 42 of
chapter 43 of the Massachusetts General Laws allows for a referen
dum petition challenging "final passage of any measure, except a
revenue loan order, by the city council."17 Thus, if each order of
taking qualifies as "final passage of a measure," each is subject to a
referendum vote. The analysis under the Charter therefore re
volves around the issue of whether or not the orders of taking are
"measures." If they are, they are subject to referendum; if they are
not, then a referendum vote may not be held.
"Measure" is defined in section 37 of the Charter as "an ordi
nance, resolution, order or vote passed by a city councilor a school
committee ...."18 In construing the term "measure," the courts
have "considered instructive the distinction between legislative and
executive acts, reasoning that only the former constitute 'mea
sure[s]' subject to referendum petition."19 Thus, if the orders of
taking are legislative acts, they may qualify as "measures" subject
to referendum; if they are deemed executive or administrative acts,
no referendum vote may be had. 20
In determining whether particular action taken by a city coun
16. Order for Eminent Domain Taking (Sept. 22, 1999) (recorded at Hampden
County Registry of Deeds) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Order of Taking].
17. Revenue loan order is not specifically defined. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43,
§ 23 (1935) (amended 1935) (referencing revenue loan order but since repealed); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 44, § 5A (1967) (repealed 1969) (same). It appears from the context of
those two Acts that it pertains to an order of the council to borrow money against
anticipated revenue. See Act of Mar. 12, 1935, ch. 68, 1935 Mass. Acts 93 (excluding
revenue loan orders by cities from certain provisions of their charters and their subjec
tion to referendum); see also Act of Mar. 22, 1967, ch. 73, 1967 Mass. Acts 34 (providing
for borrowing by cities, towns, and districts in anticipation of revenue).
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 37 (1998) (defining "measure").
19. Andrade v. City Council, 547 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Mass. 1989).
20. See Jordan v. City Clerk, 436 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Murphy
v. City of Cambridge, 173 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Mass. 1961).
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cil is legislative or executive, the courts have noted that the "crucial
test is 'whether the proposition is one to make new law or to exe
cute law already in existence."'21 Applying this test and defining
what is a legislative act has proven difficult. "The line between ex
ecutive and legislative actions is sometimes difficult to delineate
and in some instances may be completely obliterated. "22
In Dooling v. City Council?3 the court described a legislative
act as "the laying down of a rule, a principle or a law by which the
conduct of a public officer may be guided. "24 Dooling, while not
addressing the issue of eminent domain, commented:
It is an act of legislation to authorize the construction of a public

building, to set a boundary to its cost and to provide money to
pay for it. But it is an executive act to select a contractor, to
agree with him as to the thing to be done, the precise price, the
terms of payment, and the numerous other conditions incident to
a building contract. 25

Another factor in favor of finding legislative action is if the vote
amount[s] to a "sweeping determination of municipal policy."26
21. Moore v. Sch. Comm., 378 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Mass. 1978) (quoting 5 E. MCQUIL.
LAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.55 (3d rev. ed. 1969)); see also Andrade, 547
N.E.2d at 929.
22. Moore, 378 N.E.2d at 50.
23. 136 N.E. 616 (Mass. 1922).
24. Id. at 617.
25. Id.
26. Gorman v. City of Peabody, 45 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Mass. 1942) (voting to in
crease salaries of all public school teachers is legislative); cf Fantini v. Sch. Comm., 285
N.E.2d 433, 435 (Mass. 1972) ("[W]e seriously doubt the applicability of initiative or
referendum procedures to acts of a school committee with respect to the appointment
or removal of particular individuals."). For a review of Massachusetts cases in which
the legislative/executive test was used to determine whether an action taken was a
"measure" and therefore subject to referendum, see Moore, 378 N.E.2d at 50 (voting of
school committee to close two public schools involved policy determination common to
legislative action); Fantini, 285 N.E.2d at 435 (voting by school committee not to reap
point superintendent is not legislative); Gorman, 45 N.E.2d at 942 (voting to increase
salaries of all public school teachers is legislative); Dooling, 136 N.E. at 617 (passing
order by city council authorizing and directing the mayor to execute three contracts was
not legislative and therefore not subject to referendum); Jordan v. City Clerk, 436
N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (voting of city council granting special permit is
an executive function and not subject to referendum petition). But see Andrade, 547
N.E.2d at 930 (voting by city council determining the percentages of the local tax levy
to be borne by various classes of real and personal property was an executive rather
than legislative function and therefore not subject to referendum); LaBranche v. A.J.
Lane & Co., 537 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Mass. 1989) (concluding that referendum process
available to challenge an amendment to city's zoning ordinance); Gould v. City Coun
cil, 465 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1984) (stating that where city council had general power
to authorize lease of city-owned property, vote of city council authorizing the mayor to
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In Andrade v. City Council?7 the court concluded that the set
ting of the tax factor by the city council was an executive act. In
reaching this decision, the court considered:
[P]rudential concerns of efficient government warrant placing
certain limitations on the definition of "measure." "In ascertain
ing the intent of the Legislature with respect to the scope and
nature of the referendum powers that it has conferred, it is ap
propriate and important to consider what the consequences of ap
plying [them] to a particular act of legislation would be, and, if it
is found that the exercise of those powers tends to destroy the
efficacy of other governmental mandates, the court ought not to
place such an interpretation upon the grant of the referendum
powers as to bring about any such result. "28

The above-cited proposition is important because it empha
sizes the consequences of a particular act of legislation in determin
ing whether that act is subject to referendum. This relaxes the
legislative/executive test almost to the point of suggesting the fol
lowing: regardless of whether an act is more legislative than execu
tive, if the consequence of allowing a referendum vote on such act
is the destruction of the efficiency of certain governmental man
dates, then the act should not be subject to referendum.
There is no Massachusetts case law directly determining the
question of whether, for purposes of the referendum statute, a tak
ing of property by a city council is a legislative act. However, case
law on the legislature's power of eminent domain is informative. In
City of Boston v. Talbot,29 the court stated:
The question whether the use for which land is taken under
the right of eminent domain is a public use is a judicial question,
and the determination of the Legislature upon it may be revised
by the court. But if the use for which the taking is made is public,
the question whether the taking of a particular piece of real estate
is necessary or expedient is a legislative question, upon which the
decision of the Legislature, as a tribunal of fact, is conclusive. 3D
enter into a long-term lease was carrying out a legislative function and therefore
referable).
27. 547 N.E.2d at 927.
28. Id. at 930-31 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Gilet v. City
Clerk, 27 N.E.2d 748, 750 (Mass. 1940».
29. 91 N.E. 1014 (Mass. 1910).
30. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Opinion of the Jus
tices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 (Mass. 1974) ("The power of eminent domain is a legislative
power .... '[It] is said that the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of ...
exercising the right of eminent domain ... either for the benefit of the inhabitants of
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Although the above-quoted cases were not referendum cases,
their language cannot be ignored. Cases from other jurisdictions
support the position that selection of a site for public use is an exec
utive or administrative act and is not a legislative one. In City of
Idaho Springs v. Blackwell,31 the Supreme Court of Colorado ad
dressed the issue of whether a city council vote to purchase a cer
tain parcel of land for a new city hall was a legislative or
administrative vote. Noting that the power of referendum is not
unlimited and does not grant the right to petition for an election on
administrative matters, the court stated that the "central inquiry is
whether the proposed legislation announces new public policy or is
simply the implementation of a previously declared policy."32 To
resolve this issue, the court used two tests: first, whether the action
related to subjects permanent or general in character (legislative),
as opposed to temporary in operation (executive); and second,
whether the action was necessary to carry out existing legislative
policies and purposes (executive or administrative) or whether it
was a declaration of public policy (legislative).33 The court deter
mined that the legislative action was the policy decision to build a
new city hall, which was encompassed in an earlier vote to impose a
sales tax for that purpose. "The choice of location and structure for
the new city hall is an act 'necessary to carry out' the existing legis
lative policy to build a new city hall" and therefore an administra
tive or executive act not subject to referendum. 34
In Nebraska, in State ex. reI. Ballantyne v. Leeman,35 the court
addressed the issue of whether the site selection for a municipal
auditorium by the city council was subject to referendum. The
court set forth the general rule that "the right to a referendum ...
is ordinarily confined to those acts of the council which are in the
exercise of its legislative power and does not extend to administra
tive or executive acts, even though such acts are exercised by reso
lution or ordinance."36 The reason for withholding a referendum in
cases of administrative decisions is that to allow a referendum to
annul or delay executive or administrative conduct would destroy
the state or of any particular portion thereof.'" (quoting Dingley v. City of Boston, 100
Mass. 544, 558 (1868)).
31. 731 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1987).
32. Id. at 1254.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1255.
35. 32 N.W.2d 918 (Neb. 1948).
36. Id. at 923.
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the efficient administration of government. "An initiative generally
is administrative if it is merely ... fact finding [to] effectuate policy
declared by the legislature."37
The Ballantyne court held:
[I]t was an act of legislation to direct and authorize the construc
tion of a public building, to fix the cost, and provide bonds to pay
for it, but that it is an executive and administrative duty to select
the site, buy same, select plans and let a contract, provide precise
cost of various items, terms of payment, and numerous other con
ditions incident to building a large municipal auditorium. Not
one of the many executive and administrative acts necessary to
complete such project is referable to a vote of the people as a
legislative act. 38
The Arizona Supreme Court has considered the differences be
tween legislative acts and administrative acts in determining
whether an act is subject to referendum. 39 The court determined
whether a city council resolution approving a road improvement
project by widening specific roads, and taking land in connection
therewith, was subject to referendum. Prior to the resolution, the
electorate of the city had approved a $30 million bond issue for the
public purpose of improving city streets. The bond proposal did not
mention particular streets. The court concluded that the issuance of
bonds was a "legislative act. "40 The resolution of identifying partic
ular streets and taking land for widening them was an administra
tive act: carrying out the public purpose established in the "bond
election" and therefore not subject to referendum. 41 That the bond
proposal did not identify particular roads to be improved gave the
"[c]ity much more leeway in deciding when and where to adminis
ter the bond funds."42 While this lack of specificity may well have
been a valid reason to oppose the bond proposal, it did not change
the council's action in widening particular streets from administra
tive to legislative. 43
In Monahan v. Funk,44 the Oregon Supreme Court stated that:
Acts which are to be deemed as acts of administration and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

42 AM. lUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 8 (2000).
Ballantyne, 32 N.W.2d at 923 (emphasis added).
Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 821 P.2d 146, 149-50 (Ariz. 1991) (en bane).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
3 P.2d 778 (Or. 1931).
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classed among those governmental powers properly assigned to
the executive department are those which are necessary to be
done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already de
clared, either by the legislative municipal body, or such as de
volved upon it by the organic law of its existence. The form of
the act is not determinative; that is, an ordinance may be legisla
tive in character or it may be administrative.
The crucial test for determining that which is legislative and
that which is administrative, is whether the ordinance was one
making a law or one executing a law already in existence. 45

The court held that where a previous ordinance had authorized the
City to sell bonds for the purpose of acquiring property for a new
crematory, a subsequent ordinance purchasing a particular piece of
property for this use was an administrative act carrying out the pre
viously adopted policy.46
There is adverse, but distinguishable, case law. In Paget v. Lo
gan,47 the court held that the act of the legislative body in selecting
a site is a legislative act where a specific state statute (a) authorizes
counties or cities to acquire, construct, and operate a mUltipurpose
stadium, (b) provides that the ultimate act of site selection belongs
to the "governing body," and (c) requires the right of eminent do
main to be exercised by the "legislative body. "48 In allowing an initi
ative to go forward, the majority opinion also relied on the fact that
no irrevocable commitments had been made. 49 A strong dissent
stated:
I find the law clear in its adherence to the rule that the pow
ers of the initiative and referendum are applicable only to acts
which are legislative in character. For good and valid reasons,
the initiative and referendum processes are not available to exec
utive or administrative acts. And the decision on the site selec
tion for the multipurpose stadium was an administrative decision
which could not be decided by the popular vote of the people. 50

The dissent further observed that "[t]he legislative decision
was made when the people ... earlier decided by popular vote to
Id. at 779-80 (citations omitted).
Id. at 780.
47. 474 P.2d 247 (Wash. 1970) (en banc).
48. Id. at 250-51.
49. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court of Washington departed from this reasoning in
later cases. See Bidwell v. City of Bellevue, 827 P.2d 339, 341-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing cases where the Supreme Court of Washington had departed from this rational
as determinative).
50. Paget, 474 P.2d at 253 (McGovern, J., dissenting).
45.

46.
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erect a multipurpose stadium and approved the issuance of general
obligation bonds to finance the construction. The building site was
merely an implementing decision."51 The dissent went on to cite
with approval the California case of Simpson v. Hite,52 wherein the
California Supreme Court held that the selection of a site for cer
tain municipal and court buildings was administrative and therefore
not subject to initiative vote. Thus, the court stated:
If the selection of sites of courts buildings were subject to
referendum, the electors could nullify every determination of the
board of supervisors to erect buildings for the courts and thereby
nullify the legislative policy and prevent execution of the duty
imposed upon the board of supervisors. Furthermore, a small
group, or various small groups, of electors, by repeated initiative
proposals for a change of site, could interfere with the supervi
sors' attempts to furnish quarters for the courts at any time, even
when the period for referendum had passed. 53

A review of the case law cited above reveals that courts are
likely to find the action legislative where it involves a determination
of municipal policy. With respect to the City of Springfield, the or
ders of taking were not "legislative." Thus, the orders were not
"measures" subject to referendum because they were simply the ex
ecution of the policy set forth in the order appropriating money for
the acquisition of a site for a baseball stadium. The appropriation
would be subject to referendum as a legislative action, but the tak
ings would no1. 54 The "legislative" action here was the acceptance
and appropriation of grant money "for the purposes outlined in the
grant, including site acquisition, relocation expenses, and costs of
demolition and development of land in connection with the new
baseball stadium."55 The orders of taking represented the execu
tion of that policy and were executive or administrative actions.
The Referendum Petition did not seek a vote on the acceptance of
the grant or appropriation of the grant money for purposes of ac
51. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
52. 222 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1950).
53. Id. at 230.
54. See Jordan v. City Clerk, 436 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) ("On
June 19, 1980, the city council resolved that the city would incur debt for the purpose of
acquiring land for a state-sponsored skating rink. While this legislative action could
have been made the subject of a referendum petition no such challenge was initiated.");
see also Dooling v. City Council, 136 N.E. 616, 617 (Mass. 1922) (noting that "[i]t is an
act of legislation to authorize the construction of a public building, to set a boundary to
its cost and to provide money to pay for it").
55. Order of Taking, supra note 16.
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quiring a site for the baseball stadium. It only sought review of the
orders of taking for the particular sites involved. The petitioners
apparently did not object to the appropriation of money for the ac
quisition of a site for the baseball stadium. They objected to the
actual site chosen. The necessity and expediency of appropriating
money for this project is a legislative act subject to referendum,
however, the administrative act of selecting the site is not.
A second point in support of labeling the takings "executive"
or "administrative" acts is that property can only be taken at the
request of any department and with the mayor's approval. 56 There
is no provision within the eminent domain statute for an override of
a mayoral veto. This factor lends more support and credence to the
position that the orders of taking were executive or administrative
acts.
A third point relates to the efficiency considerations voiced in
Andrade v. City Council. 57 "Initiative and referendum may apply
only to legislation; administrative acts generally are exempted from
initiative and referendum. The reason for withholding referendum
to annul or delay executive or administrative conduct would de
stroy the efficient administration of government. "58 If each order
of taking were subject to a referendum vote, then vast road widen
ing projects, for example, would potentially be subject to hundreds
of referendum votes and result in considerable delay. Similarly, in
the present situation, if a referendum vote were held and were suc
cessful, each successive site selected for the baseball stadium would
potentially be subject to another referendum vote.
Notwithstanding the three points above, the language in Ding
ley v. City of Boston 59 and City of Boston v. Talbot 60 clearly states
that eminent domain is a legislative power. If true, exercise of such
power would seem to be a legislative act. In analyzing the legisla
tive/executive issue in the context of the referendum provisions, the
56. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000). The City has a Plan A form of govern
ment. /d. §§ 46-55; Kaczmarski v. Mayor of Springfield, 193 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass.
1963). Under Plan A, the mayor is the chief executive and "every order, ordinance,
resolution, and vote passed by the city council, and relating to the affairs of the city,
must be presented to the mayor for his approval." DOUGLAS A. RANDALL & DOUGLAS
E. FRANKLIN, MASSACHUSETrS PRACTICE: MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 109 (4th
ed. 1993) (describing the Plan A form of government). In general, a two-thirds vote of
the council is required to override a veto by the mayor.
57. 547 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1989).
58. 42 AM. lUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 8 (2000).
59. 100 Mass. 544, 558 (1868).
60. 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910).
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analysis must be that the legislative power of eminent domain is the
general power to authorize and appropriate money for an eminent
domain taking. The mechanics of picking a particular site for a
given project are an administrative or executive function, even
though the order of taking must be voted on by the city council and
approved by the mayor. Further evidence of this is the requirement
in chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws that
the taking be "at the request of any department," since presumably
the department involved would have unique knowledge regarding
an appropriate site for a particular public project. 61
II.

MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION As ApPLIED TO LOCAL
REFERENDUM ON EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS

In order to determine whether the local referendum law62 is
constitutional as applied to an eminent domain taking, two provi
sions of the Massachusetts Constitution must be considered: part 1,
article 10 and amended article 48.

A.

Article 10

Part 1, article 10 of the Massachusetts Constitution ("Article
10") addresses the power to take property by eminent domain, stat
ing in pertinent part:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in
the enjoyment of his ... property, according to standing laws. He
is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of
this protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent,
when necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can,
with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without
his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people.
In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by
any other laws than those to which their constitutional represen
tative body have given their consent. And whenever the public
exigencies require that the property of any individual should be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compen
sation therefor. 63

The phrase "representative body of the people" has been inter
preted to mean the state legislature. 64 Article 10 gives the Legisla
61.
62.
63.
64.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000).
Id. § 42.
MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1 (emphasis added).
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 (Mass. 1974).
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ture alone the ability to decide whether to exercise the power of
eminent domain in a particular instance. 65 The Massachusetts Con
stitution contains no express grant of eminent domain power to the
people themselves and it should not be construed to confer that
power implicitly because statutes delegating eminent domain power
are "in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property
and must be construed with reasonable strictness .... "66
Under Article 10, only the "representative body of the people"
may take private property without the owner's consent. 67 The rep
resentative body of the people of Springfield is the city counci1. 68
The City's Taking Law69 expressly requires that the exercise of emi
nent domain power be through the city council, at the request of
any department, and with the approval of the mayor under chapter
79. Because the Referendum Petitions in the instant case seek to
override the city council's decision to take the Site, application of
the local referendum law70 would violate Article 10 of the Massa
65. Id.; Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544,558 (1868) ("[T]he legislature is
the sole judge as to the expediency of ... exercising the right of eminent domain ...
either for the benefit of the inhabitants of the state or of any particular portion
thereof.") (emphasis added); see also Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072
(Mass. 1905) (confirming right of the Legislature "to decide absolutely and finally upon
the necessity of the taking").
66. Burnham v. Mayor & Aldermen, 35 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1941).
67. MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1.
68. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 50 (2000) ("The legislative powers of the city
shall be vested in a city council ....").
69. [d. § 30 ("At the request of any department, and with the approval of the
mayor and city council under Plan A ... the city council may, in the name of the city,
purchase, or take by eminent domain, under chapter seventy-nine, any land within its
limits for any municipal purpose ....").
70. Id. § 42 (2000).
If, within twenty days after the final passage of any measure, ... a petition
signed by registered voters of the city, ... protesting against such measure or
any part thereof taking effect, is filed with the city clerk, the same shall there
upon and thereby be suspended from taking effect; and the city council ...
shall immediately reconsider such measure or part thereof; and if such mea
sure or part thereof is not entirely rescinded within twenty days after the date
of the certificate of the registrars, the city clerk shall submit the same, by the
method herein provided, to a vote of the registered voters of the city, ... and
such measure or part thereof shall forthwith become null and void unless a
majority of the registered voters voting on the same at such election vote in
favor thereof.
The petition described in this section shall be termed a referendum petition
and section thirty-eight shall apply to the procedure in respect thereto, except
that the words "measure or part thereof protested against" shall for this pur
pose be understood to replace "measure" in said section wherever it may oc
cur, and "referendum" shall be understood to replace the word "initiative" in
said section.
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chusetts Constitution, which vests exclusive authority to decide
whether or not to take private property in the "representative body
of the people."71 That authority cannot be overridden by
referendum.
B.

Article 48

The Massachusetts Constitution does not grant the referendum
power at the local level. Article 48 of the Amendments to the Mas
sachusetts Constitution ("Article 48") does, however, expressly rec
ognize that although the legislative power is vested in the General
Court:
[Pjeople reserve to themselves the popular initiative, which is the
power of a specified number of voters to submit constitutional
amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection;
and the popular referendum, which is the power of a specified
number of voters to submit laws, enacted by the general court, to
the people for their ratification or rejection.7 2

In Article 48, the people expressly reserved to themselves the

power to ratify or reject laws enacted by the Legislature. The pur
pose of the referendum provisions in the Massachusetts Constitu
tion is to enable the people to pass upon action taken by the
Legislature.7 3 "A fundamental principle of our system of govern
ment is that power to make laws for the general welfare is vested in
the General Court, except as affected by article 48 of the Amend
ments to the Constitution. That power cannot be surrendered or
delegated. "74
The referendum power reserved by the people is not unlimited.
The Massachusetts Constitution specifically excludes certain sub
jects from the statewide initiative and referendum provisions of Ar
ticle 48:
No proposition inconsistent with anyone of the following rights of
the individual, as at present declared in the declaration of rights,
shall be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: The
right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to
public use; the right of access to and protection in courts of jus
tice; the right of trial by jury; protection from unreasonable
Id.
71.

n.

73.
74.

MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1.
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 1 (emphasis added).
Mass. Atty. Gen. Op. (Apr. 14, 1966).
Opinion of the Justices, 191 N.E. 33, 35 (Mass. 1934).
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search, unreasonable bail and the law martial; freedom of the
press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; and the right of
peaceable assembly,?5

Article 48 contains "mandatory" provisions with which the
General Court and the people must comply,?6 Under these consti
tutional exclusions, any proposition that is inconsistent with the
"right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to
public use" cannot be the subject of a referendum petition. This
exclusion clearly applies to eminent domain takings because "[t]he
duty of paying an adequate compensation, for private property
taken, is inseparable from the exercise of the right of eminent
domain."77
Article 48 pertains to laws made by the General Court; it does
not permit the people to have a referendum upon purely local mat
ters. That power only exists by statute-specifically, the local refer
endum law. "A statutory initiative or referendum may be subject to
the same state and federal constitutional limitations as are the state
legislature and the statutes which it enacts."78 Although the local
referendum law does not contain an express exclusion for constitu
tionally protected rights, Article 48 expressly prohibits a statewide
referendum on any proposition inconsistent with the right to re
ceive compensation for an eminent domain taking. The local refer
endum law should be harmonized with the exclusionary provisions
in Article 48.
The local referendum law thus cannot be used to override the
City's taking of the Site. Article 10 requires that type of decision to
be made by the "representative body of the people," which is the
city council.79 In addition, applying the local referendum law to the
75. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2, § 2 (emphasis added). Another section of
Article 48 also provides limitations on referendum petitions: "No law that relates to
religion, ... or to ... judges; or ... courts; or the operation of ... a particular town, city
or other political division ... ; or that appropriates money for the current or ordinary
expenses of the commonwealth ... shall be the subject of a referendum petition."
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 3, § 2.
76. Opinion of the Justices, 34 N.E.2d 527, 539 (Mass. 1941) ("The provisions of
said article 48 touching the description are mandatory and not simply directory. They
are highly important. There must be compliance with them.").
77. Bromfield v. Treasurer & Receiver-Gen., 459 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Mass. 1982)
(quoting Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. County Comm'rs, 103 Mass. 120, 124 (1869»;
see also Att'y Gen. v. Boston & A.R Co., 35 N.E.2d 252, 257 (Mass. 1893) ("The power
to take and the obligation to indemnify for the taking are inseparable." (quoting Drury
v. Midland RR, 127 Mass. 571, 576 (1879))).
78. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 2 (2000).
79. MASS. CONST. art. 10.
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City's taking of the Site would violate the spirit of Article 48's ex
clusionary provisions that expressly prohibit a referendum upon
propositions that are inconsistent with the "right to receive com
pensation for private property appropriated to public use."80

III.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS ApPLIED TO LOCAL
REFERENDUM ON EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS

The United States Constitution establishes delicate balance be
tween the natural right of private property and the inherent govern
mental power of eminent domain. Application of the local
referendum law to challenge the City's eminent domain taking of
the Site would interfere with this carefully crafted balance by violat
ing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The constitutional provision known as the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment 81 guarantees that private property will not be
taken for a public use without just compensation. The Takings
Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole. "82 The Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution contains a "guaranty of due process of law."83
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of
the most important provisions in the Constitution. 84 It makes the
protections in the Bill of Rights binding on both the states and the
federal government. The constitutional guarantee of due process of
law prohibits the government from arbitrarily or unfairly depriving
individuals of basic constitutional· rights. The United States Su
80. MASS. CaNST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2, § 2.
81. U.S. CaNST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
82. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
83. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shaH abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. The right to due process of law "has been described as the very essence of a
scheme of ordered justice." 16B AM. lUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 895 (1998) (foot
notes omitted).
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preme Court85 has pointed out that "the core" of the due process
concept is "protection against arbitrary action. "86
The Takings Clause in the United States Constitution does not
provide any right to a referendum. The Takings Clause recognizes
the inherent governmental power of eminent domain and perma
nently binds the exercise of that power to the individual's right to
receive compensation when the government takes his property. A
legal analysis of the Due Process and Takings Clause illustrates that
these provisions prohibit a referendum on the eminent domain tak
ing of the Site.
The Takings Clause inextricably intertwines the power to take
property with the duty to pay for it. The Supreme Court has recog
nized the unbreakable bond as inviolate:
[I]t was held to be a settled principle of universal law, reaching
back of all constitutional provisions, that the right to compensa
tion was an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent do
main; that the one was so inseparably connected with the other
that they may be said to exist, not as separate and distinct princi
ples, but as parts of one and the same principle; and that the
legislature "can no more take private property for public use
without just compensation than if this restraining principle were
incorporated into and made part of its state constitution."87

After a taking has occurred, the permissible areas of challenge
are confined to the purpos~ of the taking and compliance with the
appropriate statutory process. 88 In this particular instance, the mo
ment the Taking Orders for the Site were recorded in the Registry
85. "[T]he Fifth Amendment ... declares that no person shall 'be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.' The Fourteenth Amendment declares
that no state shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law,' and is a limitation only upon ... the state." Id. § 890 (citation omitted).
86. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,845 (1998) (citations omitted);
see also 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.01 (rev. 3d ed. 2000) (observing that
"[t]he constitutional protections of due process as they relate to eminent domain serve
as the basis for the requirements that must be fulfilled in eminent domain
proceedings").
87. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238
(1897) (citations omitted).
88. Massachusetts cases recognize two situations in which the validity of an emi
nent domain taking is subject to legal challenge: "[T]he taking was for an invalid pur
pose, i.e., not a public one, or ... the taking authority had failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of [chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws]." Cumber
land Farms, Inc. v. Montague Econ. Dev. & Indus. Corp., 650 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (citations omitted); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 10 (2000)
("When the real estate of any person has been taken for the public use ... , but such
taking, entry or damage was not effected by or in accordance with a formal vote or
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of Deeds, title to the Site vested in the City and the former owners
of the Site obtained the vested right to just compensation. 89 The
government's power to take private property and the individual's
right to receive compensation are inseparable, and are not subject
to local referendum. Every act of the government or the people is
subordinate to the Constitution, in which the framers carefully bal
anced the inherent governmental power of eminent domain with
the natural right of private property. This unbreakable bond can
not be changed by local referendum.
For the cities and towns of the Commonwealth to exist as via
ble governmental entities, they must possess the necessary power to
fulfill their responsibilities. For the security of the people, these
powers must be kept within safe and well-defined limits. The
United States Supreme Court has pointed out that these limits are
mandated by the Due Process Clause because:
[A] legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the prop
erty of one individual and give it to another individual, would not
be due process of law, as enjoined by the fourteenth amendment,
it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that
amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the state
to public use, and without compensation, of the private property
of the citizen. The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure
to be observed in the taking of private property for public use,
but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for
compensation. 90

Due process issues are analyzed in terms of both procedural
due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process
requires that state procedures that deprive an individual of life, lib
erty, or property must be "adequate in light of the affected interest.
Substantive due process, however, imposes limits on what a state
may do regardless of what procedural protection is provided. "91
Procedurally, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process in an eminent domain taking of private property has been
codified by the legislature in chapter 79 and in the City's Taking
Law.92 Applying the local referendum law to the City's eminent
order ... duly authorized by law ... the damages therefor may be recovered under this
chapter ....").
89. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2000).
90. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 236-37.
91. Fournier v. Reardon, 160 F.3d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
92. The Supreme Judicial Court, in discussing due process, has observed that the
protection afforded property interests by both article 10 of the Massachusetts Declara
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domain taking of the Site raises serious procedural due process
concerns.
The former owners of the Site had a legally vested interest to
receive just compensation for what was taken from them. A vested
interest in money is a recognized property right.93 The referendum
petitions, by initially suspending and, if approved by the voters, in
validating the City'S taking of the Site, would deprive these individ
uals of substantial monetary compensation to which they were
entitled.
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." We have de
scribed "the root requirement" of the Due Process Clause as be
ing "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing
before he is deprived of any significant property interest."94

The local referendum law does not provide for notice and an
opportunity to be heard before a measure is suspended from taking
effect, reconsidered, and entirely rescinded by the city council, or
before it is nullified and voided by an election. Application of the
local referendum law to the City's eminent domain taking of the
Site would deprive the former owners of the Site of their vested
property interest in the substantial compensation awarded them by
the City. Thus, a referendum on the eminent domain taking of the
Site does not provide sufficient procedural due process to the for
mer owners.
Application of the local referendum law to the City's eminent
domain taking of the Site also violates substantive due process. Al
though there is no generally accepted or universally applicable defi
nition of substantive due process, the meaning of that concept and
its practical import are thoroughly established in our law. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized the complexities en
countered in attempting to define the limits of substantive due
tion of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution "is
subject to the same analysis." Accordingly, "we shall make no specific distinctions for
the purposes of our opinion." Opinion of the Justices, 563 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (Mass.
1990) (citations omitted).
93. See Hellen v. City of Me'dford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905) ("[T]he peti
tioners were entitled, under the Constitution and the statutes then in existence, to have
their damages paid in money. This was a vested right.").
94, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citations
omitted).
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process. 95
Substantive due process "provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests" including "the specific freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights .... "96 The practical significance of this concept
is that the fundamental rights and interests to which the concept
attaches receive an elevated form of legal protection, making them
nearly invulnerable to governmental infringement. A useful meth
odology to analyze substantive due process issues is the two
pronged test utilized by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg: 97
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi
tion," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a
"careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide
the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," that di
rect and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As
we stated recently ... the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the
government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."98

A local referendum on the City's eminent domain taking is in
consistent with the constitutional requirement of substantive due
process of law. This question of first impression is analyzed in two
different ways: first, by applying the two-pronged test used by the
Court in Glucksberg; and second, by applying the traditional legal
tool which serves as the basis for our common law-finding an ap
plicable analogy.
The first prong of the Glucksberg substantive due process test
requires that an appropriate historical analysis be performed. In
this case examining the history, legal traditions, and practices of the
City's taking law, chapter 79, and the local referendum.
95. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) ('''Due process has
not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any
code."') (citations omitted).
96. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted).
97. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
98. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
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Eminent domain is an essential, inherent, and unalienable as
pect of governmental authority. More than a hundred years ago,
the Supreme Court observed that "[i]n every government there is
inherent authority to appropriate the property of the citizen for the
necessities of the State, and constitutional provisions do not confer
the power, though they generally surround it with safeguards to
prevent abuse. "99
The State's inherent power to take property by eminent do
main is a power that "cannot be contracted or bartered away ...
[for it] 'must continue unimpaired in the State."'lOO A leading trea
tise on the law of eminent domain states:
[The] power of eminent domain does not require recognition by
constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited
form. Because of the concept of the power as an inherent attri
bute of sovereignty, positive assertion of limitations upon the
power is required. This requirement is met by the provisions
found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of
property by eminent domain. Such constitutional provisions
neither directly nor impliedly grant the power of eminent do
main, but are simply limitations upon a power already in exis
tence which would otherwise be unlimited. lOl

Among our natural rights as individuals is the right to prop
erty. In America, an important feature of this natural right is the
requirement of just compensation when the government takes our
property. This has been explicitly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court:
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a
vital principle of republican institutions. "Next in degree to the
right of personal liberty," Mr. Broom, in his work on Constitu
tional Law, says, "is that of enjoying private property without un
99. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240
(1897).
100. Town of Chelmsford v. DiBiase, 345 N.E.2d 373, 375-76 (Mass. 1976); see
also Burnes v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 92 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Mass. 1950); Weeks v. Grace,
80 N.E.2d 220, 221 (Mass. 1907); Eastern RR v. Boston & Maine RR, 111 Mass. 125,
130-31 (1872).
101. 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 1-91 to
1-92 (rev. 3d ed. 2001); see also id. § 1.4 ("It is now well settled that the provisions of
the state constitutions are limitations upon an otherwise absolute legislative power and
not grants of authority to the legislature."); id. § 1.42, at 1-132 ("What distinguishes
eminent domain from the police power is that the former involves the taking of prop
erty because of its need for the public use while the latter involves the regulation of
such property to prevent its use thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public
interest.") (emphasis added).
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due interference or molestation." The requirement that the
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa
tion is but "an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the
common law for the protection of private property. It is founded
in natural equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law.
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would be
come worthless if the government possessed an uncontrollable
power over the private fortune of every citizen. "102

The City of Springfield has a "Plan A" form of governmenU03
Chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws expressly
authorizes cities with a "Plan A" form of government to take prop
erty by eminent domain. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu
setts ("SJC") has pointed out that all cities with standard charters
are controlled by section 30:
But it is an express requirement of c. 43, § 30, that any
purchase or taking of land by the city be "at the request of any
department." We must read the statute as requiring the request
of a department as a condition precedent to any purchase or tak
ing of land. The reason for the requirement may have been that
the Legislature thought it would be safer if the necessity for a
particular purchase or taking and the adaptability of the land to
the proposed use should first become apparent to some depart
ment iil the course of the performance of its duties, and if the
department should first decide to make a request. Whatever the
reason was, the Legislature saw fit to make the requirement, and
it cannot be ignored.
The whole purpose of c. 43, § 30, was to place limitations
upon the purchase or taking of land in order to prevent hasty or
ill advised action by city councils. The word "department" in this
section plainly refers to an executive or administrative depart
ment of the city government . . . . It does not refer to the city
council itself, even though that body may sometimes in common
speech be called the legislative department of the city to distin
guish it from the administrative departments. It was not in
tended that the city council should request itself to make a
purchase or taking. 104
102. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 235-36 (citations omitted);
see also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("Property does not
have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful depriva
tion ... is in truth a 'personal' right .... That rights in property are basic civil rights has
long been recognized.").
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000); see also sources cited supra note 56.
104. Shea v. Inspector of Bldgs., 83 N.E.2d 457, 460-61 (Mass. 1949) (citations
omitted).
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Chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws contains "pro
visions relative to the taking of property by eminent domain and
the award and recovery of damages for property taken."105 The
SJC recognized that the "taking of land from a private owner
against his will for a public use under eminent domain is an exercise
of one of the highest powers of government. Statutes authorizing
the exercise of this right must be strictly complied with."106
The local referendum law establishes a procedure for direct,
democratic decision-making. Although the general concept of the
referendum in Massachusetts may date back to Plymouth Col
ony,107 the right of referendum at the local level was apparently
nonexistent under state statute until it was adopted in 1915.108 The
Massachusetts Constitution was amended on November 5, 1918, to
provide for an initiative and referendum regarding laws passed by
the General Court. Debates concerning the creation of initiatives
and referendums took place in July 1917 in the Committee on Initi
ative and Referendum and provide insight into the general legal
traditions that may have given rise to the local referendum law.
Throughout these debates, many of the representatives made re
marks concerning the purpose and the goals of the resolution pro
posing to amend the Massachusetts Constitution. For example, Mr.
Joseph Walker of Brookline remarked that "the initiative and refer
endum simply gives a method of appeal from the decision of the
Legislature to the people."109 Mr. Walker further stated that "the
105. Id. at 458; see also Inhabitants of Watertown v. Dana, 150 N.E. 860, 862
(Mass. 1926) ("The adoption ... by the general court of G. L. c. 79 ... may be pre
sumed ... to provide a uniform system of procedure, so that everybody concerned will
know how to take land by eminent domain .. " Exceptions cannot easily be read into
such a statute with such a history.").
106. Lajoie v. City of Lowell, 100 N.E. 1070, 1071 (Mass. 1913); see also Spare v.
City of Springfield, 120 N.E. 854, 855 (Mass. 1918) (stating that the "taking of property
by eminent domain is an act strictissimi juris and is valid only when the statutory re
quirements are performed with exactness"); Laney v. City of Boston, 70 N.E. 88, 89
(Mass. 1904) ("The general rule of law is that where the Legislature authorizes the
taking of land for a public use, and the taking is in accordance with the statute, and a
plain and adequate remedy is provided for compensation, the remedy provided by stat
ute is exclusive."); Mugar v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 552 N.E.2d 121, 123-24 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990) ("The taking of private property for a public purpose by eminent do
main is an inherent attribute of sovereign power. Judicial review is limited to the ques
tions whether a taking was made for a legitimate public purpose, and whether the
deprived landowner received just compensation ...." ) (citations omitted).
107. Statement of Robert Luce of Waltham, in 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHU·
SETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1917-1918, at 118 (1918) [hereinafter DEBATES].
108. See Act of May 20, 1915, ch. 267, pI. 1, § 42, 1915 Mass. Acts 302.
109. DEBATES, supra note 107, at 25.
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initiative and referendum ... will be a step forward, a long step and
an effective step, on the part of those who stand for a fairer and a
squarer deal."110 Dissenters on the Committee on Initiative and
Referendum were concerned that the very idea of a check on the
legislature would disrupt, if in fact not destroy, the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of Massachusetts. The dissenting
members wrote that in their view, the referendum and initiative
would be subversive to the cornerstones of the United States Con
stitution including representative government division of public
powers, guarantee of personal immunities, and judicial protection
of constitutional guarantees.1 11
For purposes of the historical analysis required by the first
prong of the Glucksberg test, it is significant that the provisions re
garding initiative and referendum in the Massachusetts Constitu
tion contain express exclusions.1 12 The debates concerning these
exclusions from the initiative and referendum are informative. For
example, Mr. Merriam remarked:
[E]ven a sovereign Nation is limited in the exercise of its
power; ... we all have natural rights which even a sovereign Na
tion in its sovereignty must recognize. It is stated in the Constitu
tion that these rights are "natural," that they are "essential," that
they are "unalienable." Now if that is so there must be a corre
sponding obligation upon the State to recognize them, otherwise
they cannot be "rights." ... The protection over property, that it
cannot be taken "except by due process of law," is an article in
the Federal Constitution. That phrase in those words is not
found in the Massachusetts Constitution. That principle still
would prevail as the law of the land beyond the power of any
initiative petition to reach it, by virtue of the Federal
Constitution. 113

The second prong of the Glucksberg test consists of a "careful
description" of the fundamental and other interests revealed in the
first prong of the test. 114 These interests are then weighed to deter
mine whether substantive due process attaches to them. If it does,
they are entitled to receive the elevated legal protection afforded
110. Id. at 49.
111. Id. at 14.
112. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2; see also supra note 75 and accompa
nying text.
113. DEBATES, supra note 107, at 1000-01.
114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
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by the Due Process Clause.1l5
For purposes of this Article, the central question under the sec
ond prong of the Glucksberg test is whether the local referendum
law, as applied to the City's eminent domain taking, violates the
Constitution's substantive due process protection afforded by
vested private property rights. The historical analysis previously
conducted with respect to natural rights, "eminent domain
power,"116 and the local referendum law reveals the existence of
two fundamental interests, and a third important, but not funda
mental interest, which must be clearly identified in order to resolve
this central question.
The first fundamental interest is the government's power of
eminent domain. This governmental power is deeply rooted in this
nation's history and legal traditions, and applies to the City's emi
nent domain taking of the Site. The second fundamental interest is
the individual's right to enjoy private property without undue inter
ference or molestation. This right of private property is founded in
natural equity. It is a principle of universal law and it is also deeply
rooted in this nation's history and legal traditions. A third interest
is the people's statutory power to nullify or void the final passage of
any measure unless a majority of the registered voters vote in favor
thereof. This power was established in the local referendum law
and, unlike the interests previously discussed, is not deeply rooted
in this nation's history or legal traditions. Although important, the
people's statutory power to nullify or void the final passage of a
local measure is not a fundamental interest protected or guaranteed
by the Constitution.
The local referendum law is a state statutory commitment to
direct democracy that ensures the people a voice in certain types of
decisions made by city government. The Glucksberg analysis set
forth above, combined with the traditional analysis discussed below,
demonstrate that a local referendum on the City's eminent domain
taking would be inconsistent with our nation's history and legal tra
ditions as they pertain to the governmental power of eminent do
main and the natural right of private property.
The government's power of eminent domain is inherent and
unalienable. The exercise of this power by the City is constitutional
115. Id. at 720-2l.
116. See id. (referring to the separate historical analysis set forth in the first
Glucksberg prong and applying it to "eminent domain power" with respect to govern
ment power, the City's Taking Law and chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws).
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unless used for an illegitimate purpose or in an irrational manner.
In balancing the government's power of eminent domain with the
individual's right to property, our Constitution established an un
breakable bond between taking and compensation. For a long time
it has been considered unlawful for the government to take private
property without providing just compensation. 117
The Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment pre
vent the Massachusetts Legislature, the City Council, and all other
persons from depriving property owners of their vested rights in
private property,118 There is no right to a local referendum on an
eminent domain taking granted in the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights. It is not one of the activities and decisions that the Supreme
Court has recognized "as so deeply rooted in our history and tradi
tions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered
liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."119
The judgment of history has confirmed the wisdom of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things, these
great works of American genius guarantee fairness in our laws, lib
erty in our lives, and security in our private property. These guar
antees cannot be nullified by a local referendum. The Constitution
prohibits any state from making or enforcing any law which de
prives any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments thus prohibit state laws that deprive the peo
ple of their legally protected property interests.
In addition to the Glucksberg analysis described above, apply
ing an appropriate legal analogy to the facts presented indicates
that application of the referendum to eminent domain takings
would infringe on substantive due process rights. When the City
recorded the Taking Orders for the Site in the Hampden County
Registry of Deeds, title vested in the City and gave rise to the City'S
obligation to pay for the property,120 The legal effect of this vesting
117. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 717 (1999) ("When the government repudiates this duty, either by denying just
compensation in fact or by refusing to provide procedures through which compensation
may be sought, it violates the Constitution. In those circumstances the government's
actions are not only unconstitutional but unlawful and tortious as well.").
118. See discussion supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
119. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727.
120. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2000) ("Upon the recording of an order of
taking under this section, title to the fee of the property taken ... shall vest in the
[entity] on behalf of which the taking was made; and the right to damages for such
taking shall thereupon vest in the persons entitled thereto ...."); see also Grove Hall
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of title in the City by eminent domain can be understood in relation
to the law of vested rights:
A right which has become vested is not dependent upon the com
mon law or the statute under which it was acquired for its asser
tion. It has an independent existence. Consequently, the repeal
of the statute or the abrogation of the common law from which it
originated does not erase a vested right, but it remains enforce
able without regard to the repeal.
In order to become vested, the right must be a ... property
right, or a right arising from a transaction in the nature of a con
tract which has become perfected to the degree that it is not de
pendent on the continued existence of the statute. 121

An order of taking "in writing, duly recorded, in conformity
with the statute, is to be treated as if it were a statute."122 Treating
the recorded Taking Orders for the Site as a statute raises the "pre
sumption against the retroactive application of new laws," which
is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law
affords the individual citizen. That presumption "is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centu
ries older than our Republic." This doctrine finds expression in
several provisions of our Constitution. The specific prohibition
on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader constitu
tional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the
civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on
the sovereign's ability to use its law-making power to modify bar
gains it has made with its subjects. The basic principle is one that
protects not only the rich and the powerful, but also the indigent
defendant engaged in negotiations that may lead to an acknowl
edgment of guilt and a suitable punishment. 123
Sav. Bank v. Town of Dedham, 187 N.E. 182, 183 (Mass. 1933) ("[U]pon the record of a
taking under eminent domain title shall vest in the body politic or corporate on behalf
of which the taking is made and the right to damages shall vest in the persons entitled
thereto."); Radway v. Selectmen of Dennis, 165 N.E. 410, 411 (Mass. 1929) ("The re
quirement that the copy of the taking be recorded is not a mere direction, it is the vital
act upon which depends the transfer of title from the landowner to the municipality. It
is the operative alienation of the land ... [and] fixes the rights of the parties.").
121. lA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCIlON § 23.34
(5th ed. 1992); see also Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905)
("[T]he petitioners were entitled, under the Constitution and the statutes then in exis
tence, to have their damages paid in money. This was a vested right.").
122. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014,1016 (Mass. 1910) (emphasis added).
123. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1997) (citations and footnotes omit
ted); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939,946 (1997) {"[T]here is
a 'presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurispru
dence.' The 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed
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Retroactive legislation is legally inappropriate for many
reasons:
Perhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation
is suspect stems from the principle that a person should be able
to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal conse
quences. Thus The Federalist stressed the desirability of protect
ing the people from the "fluctuating policy" of the legislature.
Closely allied to this factor is man's desire for stability with re
spect to past transactions.... A substantial basis for the policies
underlying the hostility to retroactive legislation is evidenced by
those opinions of the Supreme Court which have held statutes
violative of the due-process clause on the basis of their retrospec
tive operation. 124

The effective date of the taking of the Site was September 23,
1999, the date the Taking Orders were recorded in the Hampden
County Registry of Deeds. These recorded Taking Orders had the
effect of a statute. At that time, a vested property interest in the
amounts awarded by the city council in the Taking Orders accrued
to the former owners of the Site. In a 1905 case holding unconstitu
tional a special act abandoning land previously taken by eminent
domain, the SJC stated:
At the time [the special act] was enacted, the fee having passed
to the respondent, the petitioners were entitled, under the Con
stitution and the statutes then in existence, to have their damages
paid in money. This was a vested right .... The statute ... did
not undertake to define the nature of the thing originally taken,
but to change the right to damages. Before the passage of the
statute the petitioners were entitled to have their damages as
sessed and paid in money. This was a substantive right. After
the statute they were deprived of this right, and were obliged to
under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal ap
peal."') (citations omitted).
124. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro
active Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 692-93 (1960); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 547 (1998) ("[F]or centuries our law has harbored a singular distrust of retro
active statutes.") (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted); Hughes
Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 947 (,"[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must
be deemed retrospective."') (citations omitted); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S.
244, 269-71 (1994) ("The largest category of cases in which we have applied the pre
sumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contrac
tual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime
importance.") (footnote omitted).
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take land instead of money. This was a change not only in the
remedy, but in the thing that the petitioners were entitled to
have. It is of no consequence whether the substantive right vests
by virtue of a provision in the Constitution or in a statute, pro
vided it is vested. The remedy may be changed, but the right to
money cannot be changed. As to that, no matter how the remedy
be changed, the result reached must be, in substance, the same
. . .. We are of opinion, therefore, that the statute is unconstitu
tional as applicable to this case.1 25
A referendum seeking to invalidate an eminent domain taking
after title has vested in the City and after the individual's right to
damages has accrued would unconstitutionally infringe upon rights
enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A retroactive
law purporting to change the legal consequences of a closed trans
action, such as a referendum seeking to undo a taking, would de
stroy the reasonable certainty and security that are the very objects
of property ownership. In enacting the local referendum law, the
legislature could not have intended such a result.

IV.

THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT

The power of eminent domain is an attribute inherent in sover
eignty; however, its exercise is constitutionally limited by two inter
related requirements: (1) the taking must serve a public purpose or
use 126 and (2) just compensation must be paid to the owner for the
property.127 This trial involved the first requirement for a valid
governmental taking of private property by eminent domain-a
public purpose. The controlling issue was whether the public inter
est was the dominant reason for the taking.
The concept of public purpose changes with the requirements
of society and there is no exact legal formula to determine whether
a taking is for a public purpose. The City's position was that the
public would actually use and receive benefits from the taking and
that no private interests would benefit, other than incidentally;
therefore, the public purpose requirement was met. The Superior
Court, in ruling that the public purpose was not clear and that the
City acted in bad faith, invalidated and set aside the takingsP8
125.
126.
127.
128.
Super. Ct.

Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905).
Burnes v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 92 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Mass. 1950).
U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV; MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1.
City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., 2000 WL 782971, at *50 (Mass.
2000).
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City of Springfield's Position

Determination of public purpose is primarily a legislative func
tion. While subject to judicial review, the legislative determination
is to be given substantial weight. The United States Supreme Court
has discussed the scope of judicial review of such a determination of
public purpose under the Fifth Amendment:
The "public use" requirement is thus coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers .... There is, of course, a role for
courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what con
stitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is
equated with the police power. But ... it is "an extremely nar
row" one .... [D]eference to the legislature's "public use" deter
mination is required "until it is shown to involve an
impossibility." ... In short, the Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what
constitutes a public use "unless the use be palpably without reason
able foundation." ... [W]here the exercise of the eminent do
main power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,
the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause. 129

The Court further observed:
[T]he fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the
public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is
less appropriate. Judicial deference is required because, in our
system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what
public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking
power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making
such determinations within their respective spheres of authority.
Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substan
tial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer
to its determination that the taking will serve a public use. 130

A court's role in reviewing the public purpose is extremely nar
row. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, "[w]hen the legisla
ture's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our
cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of tak
ing-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socio
economic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal
129. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
130. Id. at 244 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).
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courts. "131 When a taking occurs for a public purpose, the issue of
whether the taking of land is necessary or expedient is a legislative
question, and the determination of the legislature, as a tribunal of
fact, is conclusive.1 32 Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de
clared conclusively. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary,
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legis
lation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of
Columbia or the States legislating concerning local affairs.13 3
Massachusetts cases are in accord. In 1899, the SJC discussed
the scope of review and the line between public and private
purposes:
From the nature of the case, there can be no precise line. The
power requires a degree of elasticity, to be capable of meeting
new conditions and improvements and the ever-increasing neces
sities of society. The sole dependence must be on the presumed
wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of
gross error or extreme wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate
judgment of the court.134

The City's taking of the Site "is entitled to the benefit of a
presumption that the taking was for a public purpose."135 Neither
the entire community, nor any significant portion of it, is required
to directly benefit from or participate in the proposed improve
ment.13 6 The City's argument was that the court should not substi
tute its judgment for the city council's as to what constitutes a
municipal purpose. To do so would raise the constitutional ques
tion of whether the judiciary is exercising legislative and executive
authority prohibited under the separation of powers doctrine.137
The SJC has described a public use as "one the enjoyment and
advantage of which are open to the public on equal terms. [Even if]
only a relatively small portion of the inhabitants may participate in
131. Id. at 242-43.
132. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910).
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (citation omitted).
134. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (Mass. 1899) (citation omitted). In
Williams, the SJC said that "while the growing tendency towards an enlargement of the
field of public expenditures should be jealously watched and carefully held in check, a
determination of this kind, once made by the legislature, cannot be lightly set aside."
[d.; see also Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 909 (Mass. 1974) (stating that the role of
judiciary in reviewing public purpose is "extremely narrow").
135. Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 237 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Mass. 1968).
136. Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Mass. 1937).
137. MASS. CONST. art. 30, pt. 1.

298

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:265

the benefits, ... the use or service must ... [affect] them as a com
munity and not merely as individuals."138 Public purpose sufficient
to support a governmental taking of private property by eminent
domain is an elastic concept that is "being enlarged and extended
with the progress of the people in education and refinement."139
Over seventy-five years after Williams was decided, the SIC, in a
case involving zoning power, wrote:
'
We live in a changing world where the law must respond to the
demands of a modern society .... "[W]hile the meaning of con
stitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation."
What was deemed unreasonable in the past may now be reason
able due to changing community values. Among these changes is
the growing notion that towns and cities can and should be aes
thetically pleasing; that a visually satisfying environment tends to
contribute to the well-being of its inhabitants.1 4o Recognizing
the value of a,beautiful city; the United States Supreme Court ...
adopted the view that the general welfare embraces aesthetic
considerations. "The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beau
tiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled."141
The Supreme Court has recognized the expansive nature of
public purpose. "Public uses are not limited, in the modern view, to
matters of mere business necessity and ordinary convenience, but
may extend to matters of public health, recreation and enjoy
lllent."142 The New Jersey Supreme Court embraced this approach,
stating "[t]he concept of public purpose is a broad one .... To be
serviceable it must expand when necessary to encompass changing
public needs of a modern dynamic society."143 Likewise in Barnes
v. City of New Haven,144 the Connecticut Supreme Court noted:
A public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with vary
138. Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d at 756.
139. Williams, 55 N.E. at 78.
140. John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717
(Mass. 1975) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
141. /d. at 717 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954».
142. Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
143. Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 842 (N.J. 1964).
144. 98 A.2d 523 (Conn. 1953).
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ing conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, chang
ing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, and
other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in
population and new modes of communication and transportation.
Courts as a rule, instead of attempting judicially to define a pub
lic purpose as distinguished from a private purpose, have left
each case to be determined on its own peculiar circumstances.
Promotion of the public safety and general welfare constitutes a
recognized public purpose. "If the expenditure of public funds
will promote the welfare of the community, it is for a public pur
pose." The modern trend of authority is to expand and liberally
construe the meaning of "public purpose." The test of public use
is not how the use is furnished but rather the right of the public
to receive and enjoy its benefit.145

There is no universal test for distinguishing between public and
private purposes.
Each case must be decided with reference to the object
sought to be \~ccomplished and to· the degree and manner in
which that object affects the public welfare. Frequently an object
presents a double aspect in that it may in some respects result in
conferring a benefit upon the public and in other respects it may
result in conferring a benefit upon or in paying money to private
individuals. In such instances the cases tend to distinguish be
tween those results which are primary and those which are secon
dary or incidental and to classify the object according to its
primary consequences and effects. At any rate it is plain that an
expenditure is not necessarily barred because individuals as such
may profit, nor is it necessarily valid because of incidental benefit
to the public. 146

Across the nation courts have faced the issue of public purpose
in the context of eminent domain takings for mUltipurpose stadiums
and concluded that stadiums meet the public purpose requirement,
despite the fact that a professional team might derive some profit
from use of the stadium. 147 In New Jersey Sports & Exposition Au
145. Id. at 527-28 (citations omitted).
146. Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Hous. Auth., 23 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Mass.
1939).
147. See Ginsberg v. County of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 692 (Colo. 1968) (approv
ing stadium to be leased to owner of professional football team and minor league base
ball club); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 699 (Mich. 1972) (holding that
bonding by county for the purpose of financing construction of a multi-million-dollar
stadium to be used by a professional baseball team was valid, construction of the sta
dium did involve a public purpose); Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270
N.W.2d 749, 754-55 (Minn. 1978) (finding that construction of publicly owned stadium
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thority v. McCrane,148 the court noted that "we are all in agreement
with the trial court and the numerous authorities cited by it, that it
is well within the discretion of the Legislature to find that the sports
and exposition complex ... is a public project and serves a public
purpose. "149
In Massachusetts, an advisory Opinion of the Justices 150 to the
Legislature recognized that a multipurpose stadium may be for a
public purpose. The Justices wrote:
We are of opinion [sic] that a large multi-purpose stadium or an
arena for public activities and events, conventions, professional
and amateur athletic events, and other large gatherings may be
for a public purpose if the expenditure of public funds, the exten
sion of public privileges, powers, and exemptions, and the use,
rental, and operation of the projects are adequately governed by
appropriate standards and principles set out in the legislation.
The Legislature may reasonably determine that there are eco
nomic, civic, and social advantages to Boston, to eastern Massa
chusetts, and to the Commonwealth as a whole, from providing in
the largest city in the State a stadium and an arena l~rge enough to
attract conventions and similar gatherings and to provide for audi
ences sufficient to support enterprises of interest to large numbers
for use by professional baseball and football teams had a public purpose); N.J. Sports &
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972) (upholding act creating special
public entity with eminent domain powers to build a sports complex noting that proper
public purposes include anything designed to promote the education or recreation of
the people); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968) (allowing city
to make expenditures in connection with the construction of a stadium to be leased to a
major league baseball team); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606, 608 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1930) (approving city plans to acquire and maintain a multipurpose stadium to be
financed by an issuance of municipal bonds, for future use of the stadium by a profes
sional baseball team); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. 1966) (em
powering City to secure a loan in the amount of $25 million to build a sports stadium
and finding that possible use of the stadium by professional athletic teams did not con
vert the project into a private enterprise so as to render the loan invalid under the
"public purpose" requirement); Citizens for More Important Things v. King County,
932 P.2d 135, 137 (Wash. 1997) (holding that funding by county to pay pre-construction
costs of a baseball stadium, prior to the team's agreement to play in stadium, was for
"public purpose"); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Wis. 1996) (uphold
ing public purpose even though the Milwaukee Brewers baseball team would benefit
from baseball park to be built).
148. 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972).
149. Id. at 552.
150. 250 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969). Advisory SJC opinions are individuals' opin
ions, not the court's. "They are not judicial decisions and are not binding upon the
court as precedents. If the same question arises later ... , the duty of the court is to
consider it anew, without being affected by the advisory opinion." Bowe v. Sec'y of the
Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 126 n.2 (Mass. 1946).
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ofpeople, and suitable to provide recreation and instruction to citi
zens and others. 151

The SJC acknowledged that while a multipurpose stadium may not
be a "traditional" public purpose, such an enterprise "may be found
to be for public objectives"152 given adequate standards protecting
the public interest.
.
A review of Massachusetts case law reveals that the City has
broad authority to take private property for a public purpose. The
power to take private property for public use may "be exercised by
the Legislature itself or it may be delegated by statute to the cities
and towns."153 The legislative authority of the City to take land by
eminent domain is set forth in chapter 79 of the Massachusetts
General Laws; in chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts Gen
eral Laws; and in the City Charter.1 54 Section 30 provides in perti
nent part that "[a]t the request of any department, and with the
approval of the mayor and city council under Plan A ... , the city
council may, in the name of the city, ... take by eminent domain,
under chapter 79, any land within its limits for any municipal pur
pose . ...155 This charter provision has been interpreted to give the
City "broad power to take land within its limits for any municipal
purpose."156 The Orders of Taking in the case at bar recite that
they are made pursuant to chapter 43, section 30 and chapter 79.
Other cases have addressed the extent of a city's authority
under general eminent domain statutes. In North Ward Co. v.
Board of Street Commissioners, 157 the court discussed the scope of
Boston's authority to take property pursuant to a statute very simi
lar to chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws.1 58
In North Ward, Boston took property by eminent domain for the
purpose of providing a location for the disposal of garbage and re
fuse. At issue, in part, was Boston's power to take property for this
purpose without explicit legislative authority. Boston had taken the
property pursuant to chapter 486, section 31 of the 1909 Acts and
Resolves of Massachusetts,159 which provided that "[a]t the request
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
omitted).
157.
158.
159.

Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
[d. at 559.
Burnham v. Mayor of Beverly, 35 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1941).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, §§ 46-55 (2000) (Plan A Charter).
Id. § 30 (emphasis added).
Poremba v. City of Springfield, 238 N.E.2d 43, 47 n.4 (Mass. 1968) (citation
104 N.E. 965 (Mass. 1914).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000).
Act of June 11, 1909, ch. 486, § 31, 1909 Mass. Acts 523.
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of any department, and with the approval of the mayor the board of
street commissioners, in the name of the city, may take in fee for
any municipal purpose any land within the limits of the city, not
already appropriated to public use."160
In analyzing whether this statute provided Boston with "au
thority to take land for the erection thereon of a plant for the dispo
sal of city refuse or garbage," the court opined that the intention of
the statute was to give Boston the right to take land "for any munic
ipal purpose" and "to enlarge the power of taking by eminent do
main so as to make it include every municipal purpose . . . ."161
Noting that the "collection and disposal of garbage and refuse con
stitute a legitimate municipal purpose," the court held that Boston
had the authority to take the property and that no further express
authority was needed. 162
Similarly, in Burnham v. Mayor of Beverly,163 the court ex
amined a municipality's power l64 to take property by eminent do
main for a municipal airport. 165 The Burnham court held that such
power was not expressly provided in the statutes authorizing the
expenditure of municipal funds for airports, nor in the statute regu
lating the airports' maintenance and supervision. Chapter 40, sec
tion 14 of the Massachusetts General Laws 166 supplied such power
by authorizing Beverly to take property "for any municipal purpose
for which the purchase or taking of land ... is not otherwise author
ized or directed by statute. "167
The broad power of cities to take property by eminent domain
was reaffirmed in Roberts v. City of Worcester,168 holding that
Worcester could take property that was part of an Urban Renewal
Area and had previously been taken by the Worcester Redevelop
tnpnt A11thorlt'tT 169

.L.L.L_.L.L"
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the defendants had the right to exercise the power of eminent do
main. The court cited cases standing for the principle that the emi
nent domain power is inherent in the sovereign and cannot be
160. [d.
161. North Ward, 104 N.E. at 966.
162. [d.
163. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1941).
164. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000); see also Shea v. Inspector of Bldgs., 83
N.E.2d 457, 458-60 (Mass. 1949).
165. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d at 244-45.
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000).
167. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d at 245.
168. 625 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1994).
169. [d. at 1367.
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di vested. 170
Prior to the specific taking at issue in Springfield, the public
purpose was recognized legislatively by the September 22, 1999,
vote of the City Council to accept $4,000,000 in grant awards and to
authorize the expenditure of such grant funds "for the purposes
outlined in the grant, including site acquisition, relocation expenses,
and costs of demolition and development of land in connection with
the new baseball stadium."171 Further, the Taking Orders reference
the appropriation, stating that the taking was "for municipal pur
poses (an appropriation of money having been made for said
purposes)."l72
The absence of any detailed legislative recognition of the pub
lic purpose to be served has been held not to affect the validity of
the taking. In Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth,173 the plaintiff
brought suit to recover land which had been taken for a state police
substation by the Commissioner of Public Safety ("Commis
sioner"). The statute enabling the Commissioner's action174 au
thorized the Commissioner to either acquire the Site by purchase or
to take the land by eminent domain. 175 While the Act described the
locus with particularity, it did "not specify any purpose for the tak
ing; nor [did] it prescribe any use to which the locus must be put. It
authorized the Commissioner 'to make such improvements on said
land as he deems desirable' and to 'expend such sums as may be
appropriated therefor."'176 The order of taking stated that the pur
pose was for "maintaining a State Police sub-station."177 The plain
tiff contended that both the Act and the order of taking were
invalid: the Act, because it did not mention the public purpose for
which the land was being taken, and the order of taking, because it
failed to allege a public purpose. In response to the plaintiff's argu
ment that the Act was invalid, the court stated:
This argument is premised upon the assumption that the public
purpose must be set forth in the enabling act. We disagree. The
Legislature clearly intended to authorize the taking of the locus.
t.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
of Public
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 1366.
Springfield City Council vote dated September 22, 1999.
Notice of Taking, supra note 10.
237 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 1968).
Act of June 7, 1957, ch. 419, 1957 Mass. Acts 297 (authorizing Commissioner
Safety to acquire land in Yarmouth).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79 (2000).
Caleb Pierce, 237 N.E.2d at 64.
Id.
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Chapter 419 describes the locus in some detail. The act is enti
tled to the benefit of a presumption that the taking was for a
public purpose and was necessary. Accordingly, it is not void on
its face. 178

The court held that the order of taking was not invalid for fail
ure to allege a public purpose, stating "[t]he order states that the
land was taken for the purpose of 'maintaining a State Police sub
station.' This is sufficient to withstand the demandant's challenge
that the order is void on its face."179 Even when the taking order
simply states that land is taken "for a municipal purpose," the tak
ing is not rendered invalid. 180
A municipal taking by eminent domain is not invalidated in the
absence of prior enacted special legislation or a local ordinance set
ting forth the details of use, operation, and rental of the civic sta
dium. 181 A review of Massachusetts case law indicates that the
absence of either a special act or local ordinance setting forth the
details of use, operation, and rental of a project does not invalidate
the taking. The validity of the taking is an issue separate from the
use, operation, and rental of condemned property.
In Sellars v. Town of Concord,182 Concord took property by
eminent domain for the municipal purposes of building a police and
fire station and a public meeting hall. At the time of the taking, a
zoning restriction prohibited the uses for which the town took the
property. The plaintiff contended that "in the absence of authority
to construct the proposed municipal buildings at the time of the
takings the town had no right to take the land. "183 The plaintiff also
argued that due to the zoning restriction, which might never be re
moved, the taking was not for a public use. The court held the tak
ing valid, noting that the taking was for a public purpose and that
the zoning restriction could either be eliminated with the permis
178. Id. at 65.
179. Id.
"
180. Byfield v. City of Newton, 141 N.E. 658, 663 (Mass. 1923); see also Bouchard
v. City of Haverhill, 171 N.E.2d 848, 849 (Mass. 1961) (failing to recite the specific
purpose in order of taking does not render the vote void; amendment could be made).
181. Opinion of the Justices, 350 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969) (discussing public pur
pose with regard to proposed legislation involving a stadium to be constructed and op
erated by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, which did not consider the issue of
whether such legislation must precede the exercise of eminent domain power by a mu
nicipality in furtherance of a given project).
182. 107 N.E.2d 784 (Mass. 1952).
183. Id. at 785.
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sion of the board of appeals or amended.1 84 Since the town's good
faith was not at issue, the court assumed that the proposed uses
were not pretenses and that the town officials would "diligently
proceed to do whatever is necessary to effectuate the objects for
which the land was taken."185 With regard to the uncertainty of the
project at the time of the taking, the court stated:
That a possibility exists that the land may not be devoted to the
proposed uses cannot be denied. But in the absence of evidence
that the town cannot reasonably expect to achieve its public pur
poses, we cannot deny its right to take land by eminent domain.
Obviously in the carrying out of the projects contemplated by the
town many steps must be taken, and they cannot all be taken at
once. It would be unreasonable to hold that the town could not
exercise the power of eminent domain until all steps necessary to
the carrying out of the projects had been taken. 186

The decision in Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth 187 further indi
cates that a lack of legislation detailing the use, operation, and
rental of property prior to the taking does not invalidate the taking.
In Ballantine, the town voted to appropriate funds to take private
property for public parking and to authorize the board of selectmen
to negotiate and enter into a lease for a private entity to operate the
parking facility.1 88 The taking was pursuant to chapter 40, section
14 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 189 There were no detailed
statutory provisions for lease of the property. The court of appeals
held that the taking was valid and the SJC affirmed.1 90
The SJC has raised concerns that the public purpose of a civic
stadium requires that "the use, rental, and operation of the project"
are adequately governed by appropriate standards and principles
set out in the legislation. 191 In the present case, the City proposed
to retain ownership of the land as well as ultimate control over its
use through the terms of the ground lease. The ground lease would
had to have been approved by the city council. 192 Once approved,
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 786.
187. 294 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973), affd in part, rev'd in part, 298 N.E.2d
695 (Mass. 1973).
188. Id. at 527.
189. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000).
190. Ballantine, 298 N.E.2d at 700.
191. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969).
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000); see also Gould v. City Council, 465
N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1984) (noting that city council approval of the lease, or city
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that lease would become the "legislation" for "use, rental and oper
ation" of the civic stadium.
To the extent that the details of stadium availability for civic
uses other than professional baseball were an issue, the City argued
that the ground lease provisions could provide adequate standards
and controls to satisfy the concerns expressed in Opinion of the Jus
tices .193 Furthermore, in light of its status as a municipal corpora
tion with home rule authority, the City stands in a distinctly
different position than the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority in
Opinion of the Justices .194
Home rule is a legal concept guaranteeing local autonomy in
local matters. A leading authority on municipal law observes that
home rule has evolved in response to legislative interference in lo
cal affairs and was designed to free municipalities from legislative
rule.
The purpose was to give local communities full power in matters
of local concern, which were to be regarded as exclusive matters
of local self-government or home rule. With the growing size of
municipalities and the increased scope of state legislation there
were at least two other reasons for providing the creation of local
governmental units to handle local problems: (1) to relieve the
legislature from the burden of dealing with local affairs ... , and
(2) the realization that local problems required more attention
and comprehensive knowledge than the state could exercise. 195

In Massachusetts, home rule is constitutionally established and
statutorily governed. The constitutional basis for home rule is the
"Home Rule Amendment,"196 while the statutory basis is the
"Home Rule Procedures ACt."197 The right of local self-govern
ment or "home rule" is a significant legal milestone in the histOiY of
the commonwealth. Before home rule was established in 1966:
[T]he regulation of the affairs of the cities and towns of the Com
monwealth was vested primarily in the General Court. In order
for a municipality to react to the needs of its citizens, it would
have to seek specific enabling legislation from the legislature.
council approval of special legislation to facilitate the lease, would likely be subject to
local referendum).
193. 250 N.E. at 558.
194. See id.
195. EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.40, at 51
(3d ed. rev. 1999).
196. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, §§ 1-9; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 7 (2000).
197. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, §§ 1-20 (2000).
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The increasing demands upon local government, together with
the time-consuming method of reacting to these demands, led to
the passage of Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution,
which established the basic right of municipalities to self-govern
ment. The Horne Rule Procedures Act (HRPA), in turn, was
passed to detail the procedures under which the municipalities
could effect this constitutional grant of home rule ... .1 98

Fifteen years later, another commentator noted:
The Home Rule Amendment ... ("HRA") ... fundamentally
altered the structure of government in Massachusetts. Prior to its
enactment, Massachusetts' municipalities were considered hierar
chical subordinates to the state legislature that could only enact
local legislation after receiving an affirmative grant of power. In
contrast, the HRA allows municipalities to act until the General
Court specifically prohibits or confines their lawmaking.1 99

Home rule authorization for the City's taking of the Site was
not necessary since a state statute200 expressly conferred eminent
domain taking power upon the City. Whenever orders "are neces
sary ... [actions] may be taken by ordinance ... resolution, order or
vote . . . . Any requirement that an ordinance ... be entitled as
such, or that it contain the word "ordained," "enacted" or words of
similar import shall not affect the validity of any action ... to be
taken by ordinance ...."201 According to the court in Oleksak v.
City of Westfield,202 "[a]n ordinance is a legislative enactment of a
city effective only within its own boundaries, and no return to any
State authority is required after its enactment."203 In an earlier
case, the court noted that "[t]here may be occasions where a Legis
lature uses the word 'ordinance' as referring to any legislative ac
tion of a city council as opposed to action purely executive."204
Massachusetts law defines an ordinance as "a vote or order of the
city council entitled 'ordinance' and designed for the permanent
regulation of any matter within the jurisdiction of the city council as
198. John W. Lemega, State and Municipal Government: Home Rule, 14 ANN.
MASS. L. 264, 264 (1967).
199. Joanna Blum Jerison, Home Rule in Massachusetts, 67 MASS. L. REV. 51, 51
52 (1982)(footnotes omitted).
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000).
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 13 (2000).
202. 172 N.E.2d 85 (Mass. 1961).
203. Id. at 87.
204. Brucato v. City of Lawrence, 156 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Mass. 1959) (citation
omitted).
SURV.
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laid down in this chapter. "205
The City's vote to take the Site by eminent domain is to be
treated as a type of local legislation. "The act ... in the form of a
taking in writing, duly recorded, in conformity with the statute, is to
be treated as if it were a statute."206 This type of local legislation is
within the constitutional right of local self-government.207 It must
therefore be upheld because it is not "inconsistent" with state laws
or the Constitution. 208 The court in Connors v. City of Boston 2 0 9
further noted that:
Massachusetts has the "strongest type of home rule," and munici
pal action is presumed to be valid. The analysis whether local
action is inconsistent with a State statute is analogous to the anal
ysis whether Federal law preempts State action; the touchstone
of the analysis is whether the State Legislature intended to pre
empt the city's authority to act. 210

In the case at bar there is no "express legislative intent to for
bid" the City's eminent domain taking of the Site. 211 Since the
City's eminent domain taking power is expressly authorized by
state statute, it does not "frustrate the purpose of the statute so as
to warrant an inference that the Legislature intended to preempt
the subject. "212 As well, no factual or legal basis exists to "infer
that the Legislature intended to preempt the field" of eminent do
main to the exclusion of local government. 213 There is no conflict
between the City's taking of the Site and the statutory power of
eminent domain. The Massachusetts Legislature has neither pre
empted nor prohibited the City's legislative determination as to the
public purpose of the proposed civic stadium. Consequently, the
City's taking of the Site should be upheld as a valid exercise of the
right of self-government in local matters.
The evidence presented at trial indicated that subsequent to
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 1 (2000).
206. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910).
207. "It is the intention of this article to reaffirm the customary and traditional
liberties of the people with respect to the conduct of their local government, and to
grant and confirm to the people of every city and town the right of self-government in
local matters .... " MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, § 1.
208. Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1999).
209.
210.

211.
1995».
212.
213.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Somerville, 652 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Mass.
Id. at 338.
Id.
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relocation, demolition, and site preparation, the City planned to
enter into a ground lease for the property with a non-profit entity
the Springfield Baseball Corporation ("SBC"), which owned a
baseball franchise. 214 At the trial, the defendants claimed that the
uncertainty of the arrangement negated the public purpose because
it was possible that final lease terms might never be negotiated. In
addressing the same issue, the court in Court Street Parking Co. v.
City of Boston 215 held:
The possibility that some lot or lots will continue indefinitely
without the construction of a building thereon could have been
provided against either by requiring that the city itself build after
a period of attempted leasing or, as the plaintiffs have suggested,
by authorizing a taking only after a lease to construct had been
secured. But it is not necessary so to limit and hamper the city in
its acquisition and development of property for a public purpose.
We hold that such aspects of private advantage as the statu
tory plan presents are reasonably incidental to carrying out a
public purpose in a way which is within the discretion of the Leg
islature to choose. 216

Similarly, the SJC in Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth 217 re
versed the appeals court holding disapproving of a plan to lease
land taken for "municipal purposes" to a third party. The appeals
court had held that although a taking of property was valid, the
town had "no authority to lease property which it had just acquired
by eminent domain for parking purposes because land so acquired
for off street parking facilities had to be 'held, used and operated by
the town itself."'218 The SJC reversed, holding instead that while it
agreed that the taking was valid standing alone, the town had the
power to lease the property despite the uncertainty as to whether or
not a lease could ever be negotiated and the uncertainty over the
214. Unless an exemption was obtained, award of the ground lease would be sub
ject to the requirements of the Uniform Procurement Act. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
30B (2000). Such exemption was obtained with regard to earlier proposal at the Chico
pee River Technology Park where the city owned land. See Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 43,
1995 Mass. Acts 606 ("An Act exempting the leasing of certain land in the city of
Springfield from certain bidding laws"); Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 44, 1995 Mass. Acts
607 ("An Act authorizing the city of Springfield to lease certain property").
215. 143 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. 1957).
216. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
217. 298 N.E.2d 695 (Mass. 1973).
218. Id. at 697 (quoting Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth, 294 N.E.2d 524 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1973)).
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substance of its final terms.219 The court found that the public pur
pose for the taking could be carried out whether the town or a pri
vate lessee operated the parking lot and that the public purpose is
not invalidated because some private benefit may ensue. 220
The "town has authority to lease the premises for use by some
one else upon condition satisfactory to the selectmen, provided that
the premises will be used for a purpose for which the town took
them."221 The court concluded that a lease arrangement by which a
private individual may operate a premises acquired for municipal
parking purposes is embraced within the language of the statutes. 222
These statutes authorize a town to make such orders as it may deem
necessary or expedient for disposal or use of its corporate property
and to make contracts for exercise of its corporate powers. 223
"We believe that the power of a town to authorize its
selectmen to enter into an arrangement by which others may oper
ate premises acquired for municipal parking purposes is 'conferred
by statute or necessarily implied' from the statutory powers ex
pressly granted to towns. "224
At trial, the City argued that the facts regarding the civic sta
dium were substantially similar to Ballantine 225 and Court Street
Parking. 226 The City Council's vote to take the Site was not contin
gent upon the negotiation of any lease, nor had a final lease been
negotiated. Furthermore, the City would continue to own the land
for the purpose for which it was taken. It intended to lease the land
to a non-profit entity which would construct and operate a civic sta
dium. Presumably, such lease would have been negotiated on terms
satisfactory to the mayor and the City Council.227 That the lease
219. The court upheld the taking, noting that "[t]he authorization to take the
premises was not contingent upon the negotiation of a lease with the Authority or any
one else." Id. at 699. Significant in the court's conclusion was the fact that "the prem
ises will in all events be owned by the town and used for the public purpose for which
the premises were acquired." Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000) ("A town ... may make such orders
as it may deem necessary or expedient for the disposal or use of its corporate prop
erty."); Id. § 4 (2000) (permitting a town to "make contracts for the exercise of its cor
porate powers").
224. Ballantine, 298 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Atherton v. Selectman of Bourne, 149
N.E.2d 232, 235 (Mass. 1958».
225. Id.
226. 143 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. 1957).
227. When and if a lease is negotiated, and assuming it is for a period of more
than three years, it will be subject to approval by the city council. See MASS. GEN.

2002]

CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE

311

had not yet been negotiated should not invalidate the taking. As in
Ballantine and Court Street Parking, the City would own the land at
all times and use of the premises would have been restricted to the
public purpose for which the premises were acquired. 228
The proposed leasing of the land for the new civic stadium pro
ject was evidence of an arrangement that would further the public
purpose. The draft ground lease required the lessee to construct
the civic stadium at "its sole cost," and lessor was prohibited from
using the premises for "any other purpose."229 The evidence was
undisputed that the Site was taken for a civic stadium and was in
tended by city officials to be used as such.
The public purpose would also be furthered under the pro
posed term in which the City would have the right to use the sta
dium rent-free for athletic events and other civic purposes subject
to the lessee's prior right to use the stadium. The baseball team
would play forty to fifty games per year in the stadium. As such,
the stadium would be available on numerous other dates for other
civic purposes including non-professional sports events, such as col
lege, high school, and amateur baseball or softball games, concerts,
and educational and recreational events. Any concerns that "the
use, rental, and operation of the project"· be adequately governed
by appropriate standards and principles could have been addressed
in a final ground lease. If satisfactory lease terms could not have
been negotiated, as in Ballantine and Court Street Parking, the City
would have retained ultimate control of the land.
To the extent that the details of stadium availability to non
professional baseball and other civic uses were an issue, ground
lease provisions could have provided adequate standards and con
trols to satisfy the concerns expressed in Opinion of the Justices .230
Unlike the Turnpike Authority in that opinion, the City was exper
ienced in the operation and leasing of similar facilities, such as the
Springfield Civic Center and Symphony Hall. Also, the City has a
LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000); see also Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 43, 1995 Mass. Acts 606
(exempting the leasing of certain land in the City of Springfield from some bidding
laws); Act of June 23,1995, ch. 44, 1995 Mass. Acts 607 (authorizing the City of Spring
field to lease certain property).
228. See McLean v. City of Boston, 97 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1951) (noting that
an arrangement to take land by eminent domain with intent to turn the property over to
a private party does not destroy the public purpose of the taking if it is "in furtherance
of a public purpose").
229. Draft of Ground Lease between City of Springfield and Lessee (on file with
author).
230. 250 N.E.2d 547, 558-61 (Mass. 1969).
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legislative branch of government in its city council which is empow
ered to control budget expenses and make land use decisions.
Under the draft ground lease, the City would not have been
responsible for the debt incurred in the actual construction cost of
the stadium, estimated in the range of $15,000,000. The lessee
would have been responsible for all expenses related to develop
ment, construction, and operation of the stadium, including utilities,
insurance, maintenance, repairs, and replacements. At the termina
tion of the lease, however, title to the stadium would have vested in
the City.
Another factor distinguishing the proposed civic stadium from
the arrangement considered in the Opinion of the lustices 231 is. the
non-profit status of the proposed tenant. As the evidence. indi
cated, the City contemplated executing a ground lease with the
non-profit SBC. This non-profit entity would construct a civic sta
dium for use by professional baseball and other civic purposes.
SBC's status as a non-profit corporation qualified it for a tax ex
emption as a public charity pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the In
ternal Revenue Code,232 This status would facilitate private
financing through tax-exempt bonds as well as private donations.
Such status is significant in light of the SIC recognition in
Helmes v. Commonwealth 233 that the public expenditure of
$6,000,000 to repair the battleship U .S.S. Massachusetts, paid to a
charitable corporation, was not in violation of the "anti-aid"
amendment. 234 As noted by the court, the public funds did not ben
efit the private corporation beyond enabling it to carry out its es
sential purpose. 235
SBC's articles of organization and by-laws set forth its pur
poses as including (a) lessening the burdens on the City in its efforts
to rehabilitate the downtown area; (b) promoting redevelopment of
and stopping community deterioration in downtown Springfield; (c)
supporting tourism and economic development; (d) establishing
baseball and softball for inner-city public school students in the
Springfield area by providing organizational support for this pur
pose; (e) expanding employment opportunities and increasing the
general level of personal income in downtown Springfield; and (f)
231. Id.
232. 1.R.c. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
233. 550 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1990).
234. Id. at 874. See generally MASS. CONST. art. 18, amended by MASS. CONST.
amends. 46, 103.
235. Helmes, 550 N.E.2d at 874.
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promoting the common good and general welfare of the City and its
residents.
As in Helmes, the purposes of the corporation limit the expen
diture of the public funds to the designated uses which lead to a
determination by the Internal Revenue Service that the entity was a
"public charity."236 Furthermore, like Helmes, the articles of or
ganization provide that upon dissolution of the corporation, the as
sets of the corporation must be distributed to another charitable
corporation or to the City of Springfield. 237
Also, similar to Helmes, no private person would be likely to
benefit specially from the expenditure. Under the by-laws of the
SBC, the board of directors would serve without compensation.
The board's composition was subject to restrictions aimed at insur
ing that control of the board would continue with civic-minded
community leaders and be operated for the benefit of the
community.
Unlike the proposal in Opinion of the Justices,238 where the
Turnpike Authority was planning to lease the stadium to a for-profit
professional athletic team, the non-profit SBC was the owner of a
Northern League baseball franchise 239 intending to play in the sta
dium. By acting in furtherance of the corporation's purpose set
forth in its articles of organization and by-laws, there was no private
inurement or benefit that would result from the corporation's activ
ities except for the incidental benefits resulting from the economic
development, that would be created. The financing for the new
civic stadium project was a creative collaboration between the pub
lic and private sectors and would have resulted in a new state-of
the-art civic stadium being constructed with only a fraction of its
total cost being paid by the taxpayers.
SBC obtained commitments of approximately $15,000,000 to
finance construction of the new civic stadium. Questions were
raised by the defendants over the uncertainty of whether those pri
vate financing commitments would be available. In a case where
similar public-private cooperation involving a taking in Boston was
being challenged, the court said:
It cannot be known in advance when private capital for this pur
236. Id. at 873.
237. Id. at 875.
238. 563 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1990).
239. Mr. Graney testified that the Northern League is an independent baseball
league, which means that it is not affiliated with Major League Baseball or its teams.
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pose will surely be available .... The possibility that some lot or
lots will continue indefinitely without the construction of a build
ing thereon could have been provided against either by requiring
that the city itself build after a period of attempted leasing or, as
the plaintiffs have suggested, by authorizing a taking only after a
lease to construct had been secured. But it is not necessary so to
limit and hamper the city in its acquisition and development of
property for a public p·urpose. 240

The same reasoning is applicable to the present case. The questions
raised as to the private financing do not affect the public purpose
here.
The public sector's total financial participation in the new civic
stadium was to be $6,000,000. One-third of this public money was
going to be derived from a $2,000,000 general obligation bond ap
proved and appropriated by the City Council in May 1995. The
remaining two-thirds of the public money was to come from a
$2,000,000 Public Works Economic Development Grant
("PWED")241 grant and a $2,000,000 Community Development Ac
tion Grant ("CDAG").242
The City applied for a PWED grant from the Commonwealth's
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction ("EOTC").
On September 10, 1999, a PWED grant in the amount of $2,000,000
was awarded to the City of Springfield by the EOTC for the civic
stadium project. The statutory source for the PWED grant derives
from chapter 732 of the Acts of 1981, entitled "An Act Providing
for a Transportation Development and Improvement Program for
the Commonwealth."243 Specifically, section 17(c) of the Act pro
vides that the purpose of the funds are for "any public works facili
ties deemed necessary for economic development by the secretary
of transportation upon petition of an appropriate local executive
government body."244
Title 701, section 5.04 of the Massachusetts Code states:
Eligible projects shall include but will not necessarily be limited
to projects for the design, construction and/or reconstruction of
existing and/or newly located public access roads, streets and
bridges, curbing sidewalks, lighting systems, traffic control and
240. Court St. Parking Co. v. City of Boston, 143 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Mass. 1957).
241. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 701, §§ 5.00-5.10 (1993).
242. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 57A (2000) (providing statutory authority for
the CDAG grant); see also id. § 1 (definitions).
243. Act of Dec. 24, 1981, ch. 732, § 17C, 1981 Mass Acts 1131.
244. Id.
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service facilities drainage systems and culverts associated with a
municipal economic development effort which seeks to or will:
(a) retain establish, expand or otherwise revitalize industrial or
commercial plants or facilities;
(b) create or retain long-term employment opportunities;
(c) have a positive impact on the local tax base;
(d) leverage high ration private investment, and;
(e) strengthen the partnership between public and private sec
tors.245

As previously noted, the Secretary approved the civic stadium as
eligible.
The City applied for a CDAG from the Commonwealth's De
partment of Housing and Community Development ("DHCD")
and received an award letter. On September 20,1999, DHCD noti
fied the City that it was "preparing a contract" for a "$2 million
grant" regarding "the Marox site of 2.44 acres" which "is decadent
and eligible for funding for site acquisition, and/or clearance, and/or
preparation."246 Under section 57 A of the MassaGhusetts General
Laws,
[a]ny eligible city or town, acting by and through its municipal
officers or by and through any agency designated by such munici
pal officers to act on their behalf, including but not limited to its
urban renewal agency, may apply to the department for a grant
in a specific amount to fund a specified community development
project. Said grants shall be in addition to the assistance other
wise made available under this chapter and to other forms of lo
cal, state and federal assistance. 247

Criteria for approval of the grants requires a finding by DHCD
that "[t]he project will be ofpublic benefit, in the public interest
and for a public purpose, consistent with the sound needs of the
community as a whole, and any benefit to private entities or indi
viduals will be indirect and incidental and not the purpose of the
proj ect. "248
The public benefits flowing from the new civic stadium project
also support a finding of public purpose. In this case, the public
purpose for the City's eminent domain taking of the Site-a new
civic stadium-promotes the general welfare of the City's inhabi
245.
246.
247.
248.

tit. 701, § 5.04 (1993).
ch. 121B, § 57A (2000); see also id. § 1 (definitions).
ch. 121B, § 57A(a) (2000).

MASS. REGS. CODE
MASS. GEN. LAWS
MASS. GEN. LAWS

Id. § 57A(b)(2).
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tants by providing civic, recreational, and economic benefits. The
civic stadium project received significant financial support from the
commonwealth,249 which provided two-thirds of the project's total
public funding. The Commonwealth's financial support for the
civic stadium is a tangible form of state recognition of the project's
public purpose.
The City Planning Department conducted an examination of
potential downtown locations for the new minor league baseball
stadium. One of the locations identified as a potential site for the
new stadium was the Chicopee River Business Park. Although the
Chicopee River location was attractive from the standpoint of "land
acquisition cost, parking and accessibility," it did not provide many
"economic spin-offs" because:
It is not likely that downtown business, even the hotels, would
realize an increase in business as a result of professional baseball.
Rather, economic spin-offs for Springfield are limited to supplier
relationships and employment.
With this in mind, it is appropriate to look at downtown
sites. Indeed the success of downtown ballparks in Cleveland,
Buffalo and Harrisburg, requires a further study of Springfield's
downtown. Two sites, Main-Congress and Carew-Bond-Patton,
come to mind ....250

After describing the properties contained in the Main-Con
gress site, the Planning Department pointed out that the Site of
fered "a blend of downtown/urban opportunities" and "a wide
latitude of spin-off attractions."251 Mayor Albano related how the
location for the new civic stadium was an important part of his ad
ministration's downtown revitalization strategy and would have a
significant impact on the quality of life in the region:
Sports and recreation have a unique significance for Springfield
249. The Commonwealth's financial support for the City's civic stadium project
followed a grant application process during which state officials carefully scrutinized the
project. They questioned the City on a number of matters. The City promptly re
sponded with· answers to the Commonwealth's questions. This occurred before the
state funds (PWED and CDAG) were awarded to the City. Springfield v. Dreison
Invs., Inc., Civ. A, No. 99-1318, 2000 WL 782971, at *25 (Mass. Super. Feb. 25, 2000).
250. Minor League Baseball Stadium, Potential Downtown Location, Springfield
Planning Department 001676 (June 1996). The Planning Department found that Inter
state 291 "is a physical barrier separating the site from the downtown area. This may
hurt the potential for spin-off development." In addition, the Planning Department
estimated the development costs of the Carew-Bond-Patton site to be higher than the
development costs of the Main-Congress site. Dreison Invs., 2000 WL 782971, at *7-8.
251. Springfield Planning Department, supra note 250.
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which is the birthplace of basketball. A new civic stadium in
Springfield will promote the City's general welfare by improving
the quality of life for City residents while bolstering the City's
image as an entertainment and tourist center. These things will
make a significant and positive contribution to the continuing vi
tality of Springfield.2s2

In support of a public purpose, the City argued that the loca
tion for the new civic stadium was an important part of a downtown
revitalization strategy. The new civic stadium would complement
other projects, such as the new Basketball Hall of Fame and the
Convention Center. Siting the new civic stadium where proposed
would further Springfield's goal of improving its downtown as a
sports and entertainment destination by bolstering the City's image
as a tourist center. The civic stadium site was carefully selected to
increase social and economic activity in the downtown area during
crucial evening and weekend hours.
Adding baseball to the City's mix of attractions would improve
the quality of life in Springfield and bring the community together.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Musmanno of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania eloquently identified the benefits of a baseball
stadium:
We are not dealing with the horse and buggy age, but with the
atomic age. But, more than that, we are dealing with a modern
development in an age which properly regards as essentials for all
the people services which heretofore were enjoyed only by the
wealthy and the affluent. There is need today to provide the
public with facilities for recreation, sports and enjoyment of out
door athletic competition. Even passive participation as an on
looker in competitive sports stimulates a desire for physical
exercise. In any event it takes the spectator into the open air and
provides him with exuberant escape from the cares of the day
and arms him with recharged energy to meet responsibilities as a
citizen. All this helps to build up a healthy community....
The objective of a community is not merely to survive, but to
progress, to go forward into an ever-increasing enjoyment of the
blessings conferred by the rich resources of this nation under the
benefaction of the Supreme Being for the benefit of all the peo
ple of that community.
If a well governed city were to confine its governmental
252. Aff. of Mayor Michael J. Albano 2, at 'II 4 (on file with City'S Comprehensive
Statement of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Civ. A, No. 99-1318, Hampden County Super.
Ct.).
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functions merely to the task of assuring survival, if it were to do
nothing but provide "basic services" for an animal survival, it
would be a city without parks, swimming pools, zoo, baseball
diamonds, football gridirons and playgrounds for children. Such
a city would be a dreary city indeed. As man cannot live by
bread alone, a city cannot endure on cement, asphalt and sewer
pipes alone. A city must nave a municipal spirit beyond its physi
cal properties, it must be alive with an esprit de corps, its person
ality must be such that visitors-both business and tourist-are
attracted to the city, pleased by it and wish to return to it. That
personality must be one to which the population contributes by
mass participation in activities identified with that city.
Hardly anything in America symbolizes a large city more
than its ... baseball team. To take the ... baseball team out ...
would be to deprive ... people of the opportunity for a spontane
ous outburst of civic pride, for which there is no substitute ....
. . . Not to have the gladsome and thrilling Opening Day of
the Baseball Season each spring, not to watch the tension
charged race of the home team against the teams from afar . . .
would be tragedy indeed .... 253

A new civic stadium would also bring intangible benefits to the
City. For example, it would enhance the image of downtown,
strengthen the community, and help promote the City's livability.
It would make people optimistic about downtown's future, as well
as provide an additional place for public gatherings. Having minor
league baseball in the City would cause Springfield's name to be
repeated throughout the Northeast in the sports pages and elec
tronic media. A stadium would bring more people downtown. It
would provide a needed opportunity for an affordable family out
ing, generate civic pride, cause greater utilization of the City's ex
isting business base, and further the City's efforts to become a
major attraction for visitors and businesses. These civic benefits,
which would be derived from the taking of the Site, supported up
holding the taking as in the public's interest. "The concept of the
public welfare is . .. spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."254
The City also argued, in support of a public purpose, that rec
253. Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 218 A.2d 906, 913-14 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J.,
concurring).
254. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted).
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reation itself is a public purpose and includes spectator sports. In
discussing the meaning of recreation with in the context of the Mas
sachusetts General Laws,255 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
stated:
"Recreation" in its most natural signification means "refresh
ment of strength and spirits after work; ... a means of refresh
ment or diversion." This would include not only the active
pursuits (playing baseball and the like) to which the plaintiffs
would apparently confine its meaning but also passive pursuits,
such as watching baseball, strolling in the park to see animals,
flowers, the landscape architecture, or other sights, picnicking,
and so forth ....256

Recreation has traditionally been recognized by the courts
across the United States as a public purpose. In 1923, the U.S. Su
preme Court specifically stated that "[p ]ublic uses are not limited,
in the modern view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordi
nary convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, recre
ation and enjoyment."257
In Massachusetts, activities which promote recreation of the
public constitute a public purpose. For example, the SJC, referring
to a statute authorizing the raising of money by taxation for the
erection of a memorial hall, stated:
[A] statute ... may be vindicated on the same grounds as statutes
authorizing the raising of money for monuments, statues, gates,
or archways, celebrations, the publication of town histories,
parks, roads leading to points of fine natural scenery, decorations
upon public buildings, or other public ornaments or embellish
ments designed merely to promote the general welfare, either by
providing for fresh air or recreation, or by educating the public
taste, or by inspiring sentiments of patriotism, or of respect for
255. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 17C (2000).
256. Catanzarite v. City of Springfield, 592 N.E.2d 752, 752-53 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992). A number of state statutes recognize recreation as a legitimate public purpose.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 44, § 7(25) (2000) (authorizing the City to incur debt for "the
construction of municipal outdoor recreational and athletic facilities, including the ac
quisition and development of land and the construction and reconstruction of facili
ties"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 45, § 14 (2000) (recognizing recreation as a suitable public
purpose for which cities may acquire land and buildings by eminent domain for pur
poses of a public playground or recreation center); Act of June 3, 1968, ch. 377, 1968
Mass. Acts 225 (creating the Springfield Civic Center Commission and declaring that
the establishment of structures to "accommodate large public and private gatherings,
banquets, trade shows, the performing arts, concerts, sports events and cultural events"
is "proper public or municipal purpose").
257. Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (emphasis added).
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the memory of worthy individuals. The reasonable use of public
money for such purposes has been sanctioned by several differ
ent statutes, and the constitutional right of the legislature to pass
such statutes rests on sound principles. 258
This principle is firmly established in other jurisdictions as well. 259
Upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing Boston
to borrow money outside its debt limit for constructing a municipal
auditorium, the SJC stated:
[T]he construction of a municipal auditorium for public exercises
and hearings, political rallies and other meetings in the exercise
of the constitutional right of assembly, and exhibitions incidental
to municipal functions such as exhibits of the work of public
school pupils and fire prevention and civil defense displays ...
would be a public purpose and if the statute limited the city to
the construction of such a hall it would be constitutional. We
think that the additional references to "an exhibition hall" or to
"conventions and other shows and gatherings" do not derogate
from construing the statute to be constitutional. 26o
Public parks, public beaches, municipal civic centers, and mu
nicipal auditoriums are all forms of recreation for which courts have
found a valid public purpose to exist. In Massachusetts, no cases
decide the issue of the public purpose nature of a stadium. There is,
however, an advisory Opinion of the Justices discussing the pro
posed legislation that authorized the Massachusetts Turnpike Au
thority to construct a stadium in which the SJC states:
[A] large multi-purpose stadium or an arena for public activities
and events, conventions, professional and amateur athletic
events, and other large gatherings may be for a public pur
nflC'O
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258. Kingman v. City of Brockton, 26 N.E. 998, 998 (Mass. 1891) (emphasis
added).
259. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841 (Cal. 1982)
("'Activities which promote recreation of the public constitute a public purpose."')
(quoting Alameda County v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 80, 85 (Ct.
App. 1964)); Ginsberg v. City of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 688 (Colo. 1968) (en banc)
(providing that a sports stadium is for the recreation of the public and is for a public
purpose); State v. Osceola County, 752 So. 2d 530, 538 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam) ("We
have on numerous cases approved as a public purpose the development of recreational
facilities."); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966) ("A sports
stadium is for the recreation of the public and is hence for a public purpose."); Mount
Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, 936 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
("Public recreational facilities constitute a public purpose and function.").
260. City of Boston v. Merch. Nat'l Bank of Boston, 154 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Mass.
1958).
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are economic, civic, and social advantages . .. from providing . ..
a stadium and an arena large enough to attract conventions and
similar gatherings and to provide for audiences sufficient to sup
port enterprises of interest to large numbers of people, and suita
ble to provide recreation and instruction to citizens and
others. 261
In its opinion, the SJC did not directly address the issue of recrea
tion but merely looked at the proposed statute.
As previously noted, other jurisdictions have held that the con
struction, operation, taking, or management of a stadium facility
would create a valid public purpose on the basis that such activity
constitutes public recreation, therefore, expanding the eminent do
main remedy permitting property to be taken for recreational pur
poses. The California Supreme Court has upheld the principle that
anything calculated to promote the education or recreation of the
people is a proper public purpose. 262 New Jersey courts also sup
port this principle. A New Jersey court upheld an act creating a
special public entity to build a sports complex, through eminent do
main if necessary.263 The court observed that "the view that the
construction and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities con
stitutes a public purpose has received virtually universal approval in
most jurisdictions."264 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in sus
taining an ordinance that authorized a loan to construct a sports
stadium, declared that "[a] sports stadium is for the recreation of
the public and is hence for a public purpose; for public projects are
not confined to providing only the bare bones of municipal life
"265
The City of Springfield argued the new civic stadium satisfied
the public purpose requirement not only because of the recrea
tional baseball use, but noted that the stadium could be used for
other public purposes, because it would not be used exclusively for
professional baseball. Besides only playing a limited number of
games a year, the team would have many out-of-town games when
the stadium could be used for other public purposes. The stadium
could be used by young athletes attending the Springfield public
schools to hold important baseball or softball games as well as host
261.
262.
263.
Super. Ct.
264.
265.

Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969) (emphasis added).
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 842.
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. Y. McCrane 292 A.2d 580, 635-30 (N.J.
Law Diy. 1971).
Id. at 598.
Martin Y. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966).
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state semi-finals and final championship games. Area schools, col
leges, and universities could make use of a new state-of-the-art
sports facility for sporting and civic events. In addition, other fam
ily-oriented programs, social, and civic events could be held in the
new civic stadium. A new civic stadium would provide activities for
the entertainment, enjoyment, and pleasure of Springfield citizens,
and would serve a paramount public purpose by promoting tourism
while providing a new forum for educational, recreational, and en
tertainment activities.
There are several types of economic benefits to the public from
a new civic stadium on the Site. These economic benefits include
jobs, taxes, and urban revitalization. The SJC held that "[r]educing
unemployment and stimulating the economy are public pur
poses."266 "'The reduction of unemployment and alleviation of eco
nomic distress,' as well as the [s]timulation of investment and job
opportunity ... are proper public purposes."267 "[F]oster[ing] the
expansion of the economy and the reduction of unemployment by
providing a role for state and local government in the stimulation of
industrial development" has been deemed a valid public purpose by
the SJC. 268
B.

Court's Resolution

The consolidated cases269 were tried before Constance M.
Sweeney, Justice of the Superior Court, over several days in Janu
ary 2000. After the trial, Judge Sweeney issued a memorandum of
decision filed February 25, 2000,270 finding that the takings were not
a valid exercise of the general eminent domain powers of the City
and were not primarily made for a public purpose. 271 The court
invalidated and set aside the takings, pursuant to Judge Sweeney's
issuance of a declaratory judgment and order for entry of judg
ment. 272 The City's claim to enjoin further statutorily required pro
ceedings on the referendum petitions were rendered moot because
the land takings were invalid. 273
266. Opinion of the Justices, 369 N.E.2d 447, 449 (Mass. 1977).
267. Opinion of the Justices, 335 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. 1975) (alteration in origi
nal) (citations omitted).
268. Opinion of the Justices, 366 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1977).
269. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
270. City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., Nos. 1999138,991230,000014,2000
WL 782971, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *50.
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The court's decision relies on two narrow and fact-specific
grounds. First, the decision holds that "when a city exercises its
power of eminent domain for the primary purpose of granting a
leasehold estate to a private entity so that the entity can build a
stadium for its baseball team, the public purpose is not c1ear."274
The court held that, under those circumstances, additional legisla
tion governing the relationship of the governmental entity and the
lessee is necessary "in order to define the public purpose."275
In support of its position, the court cited to and quoted the
Opinion of the Justices:
The provision of such facilities ... is not as clearly and directly a
public purpose as supplying housing, slum clearance, mass trans
portation, highways and vehicular tunnels, educational facilities
and other necessities. As to such essential enterprises, the public
objectives are well understood. The appropriate and usual meth
ods of achieving them also, on the whole, are well established. In
such cases, somewhat general standards of public convenience
and necessity and principles of prudent, frugal government ad
ministration, necessarily to be implied from the essential projects
themselves, may adequately guide the expenditure of public
funds, even where there may be involved arrangements with pri
vate persons or entities operating for profit. 276

Judge Sweeney noted that the arrangement between the City
and SBC did not prohibit SBC from assigning its lease to an entity
operating a team for profit. 277 As under the proposed lease terms
such a profit-making enterprise would not owe any funds to the
City, the court expressed concern with the potential private windfall
that would ensue. 278 The court also noted that in addition to own
ing the team, SBC or its assignee could assess fees for civic uses of
the stadium by entities other than the City.279 Since the profes
sional baseball team's use of the stadium took priority over all civic
functions, the court expressed concern over the absence of any
standards defining the extent of such use. 280 Judge Sweeney
opined:
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
concern).
279.
280.

Id. at *45.
Id.
250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969).
Dreison Invs., 2000 WL 782971, at *41.
Id. (citing Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 559-60, which noted same
Id. at *42.
Id.
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Before six million dollars of public money can be spent to ac
quire land for the principal and immediate purpose of benefitting
a not-for-profit corporation, and potentially to benefit a profit
making enterprise, legislative standards and principles must be in
place "to protect all aspects of the public interest and . . . to
guard against improper diversion of public funds and privileges
for the benefit of private persons and entities?81

As Springfield faced one roadblock after another in its at
tempts to secure a franchise, the pursuit "for a professional baseball
team took on a life of its own."282 The court concluded that by the
time of the taking the City had departed "from its basic obligation
to protect the public interest and guard against improper diversion
of public funds and privileges for the benefit of private persons and
entities."283 The court found that, at the time of the takings, the
public was not the "primary beneficiary of the City's contribu
tion. "284 The proposed ground lease terms primarily benefited
SBC, not the City.285
As a second ground for invalidating the takings, the court
found that the takings had to be set aside "even if legislation estab
lishing standards for the City's proposed participation in the sta
dium project were not required."286 According to the court, the
evidence clearly and convincingly established that the City acted in
bad faith when it exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire
title to the land parcels. 287 Judge Sweeney's determination that the
City acted in bad faith in taking the land parcels is grounded mainly
"on the actions and representations of the mayor in the events giv
ing rise to the takings."288 As property cannot be taken without the
mayor's approval,289 his intent is of import. The court found that
facts demonstrate that "until sometime in 1997, city officials were
primarily motivated by the public interest in their efforts to attract
professional baseball to Springfield."290 Judge Sweeney made fac
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *47.
284. Id.
285. See id. at *49.
286. Id. at *45.
287. !d.
288. Id. at *46 ("The actions, words and knowledge of the mayor, acting within
his authority, are attributable to the City.") (citing Pheasant Ridge Assocs., Ltd. v. Bur
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tual findings that the project initially sought to serve many tangible
and intangible public purposes, i.e., providing family-oriented activ
ities, increasing business for the hotel, restaurant, and cafe trades,
providing increased opportunities for employment, revitalizing the
central business district, and increasing public spirit and pride. 291
There is no specific instant that indicates the City's departure
from its responsibility to safeguard the public interest and prevent
the improper use of public moneys and privileges for the benefit of
individuals and entities. 292 The court declared that it was a gradual
process evidenced by the mayor's disregard for separate interests in
the stadium project.293 Judge Sweeney noted that the City did not
seriously endeavor to separate the City and SBC's shared objective
of local professional baseball from their distinct financial interests
in the project. 294 The court also found that bad faith was estab
lished because the mayor and his agents, in applying for the CDAG
and PWED grants, knowingly made material misrepresentations to
the Commonwealth for the purpose of securing four million dollars
in state funding for the stadium site. 295
For the above reasons, the court found the takings invalid as a
matter of law, rendering moot the city's petition to prevent the ref
erendum process. 296 The court set aside the takings in accordance
with the court's Declaration of the Rights of the Parties and Order
for Entry of Judgment. 297 In this Declaration, the court perma
nently enjoined the City "from asserting any further claim to title in
the properties" and enjoined the City "from taking any further ac
tion with respect to the referendum petitions."298 The court further
ordered that the City "take all reasonable and necessary action to
restore clear title to the properties," and held that the owners of the
property had a right to proceed against the City with claims for
monetary damages, if any, caused by the cloud on its title by reason
of the invalid taking order. 299
Although the City strongly objected to the factual findings as
well as legal reasoning of the decision, no appeal was taken as the
parties reached a negotiated settlement of all claims in the case by
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Id.
/d.
[d.

at *47.

at *48.
at *50.
at *2.

326

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:265

means of the City reconveying title to the land to the former owners
and the SBC paying monetary consideration in exchange for a re
lease of all claims for damages against it and the City.
CONCLUSION

It does not appear under Massachusetts law that the state ref
erendum statute applies to an eminent domain taking. Even if it
were to apply, the provisions of the state and federal constitutions
prohibit a referendum from undoing a taking by eminent domain.
The court did not reach these issues in this case because the judge
determined the underlying takings did not meet the public purpose
requirement. All takings must be made for a public purpose to be
legal. It remains to be seen whether in future cases, an eminent
domain taking may validly be the subject of a local referendum.

